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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Hadley v. Baxendale,1 one of the most celebrated cases in contract 
law,2 sets forth the default rule that unforeseeable consequential 
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 1. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
 2. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 92 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 
2d ed. 1995) (“Hadley v. Baxendale is still, and presumably always will be, a fixed star in 
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damages are unrecoverable.3 The case has come to represent an im-
portant limit to the general rule awarding full expectation damages 
for breach.4 And over time, Hadley has taken on even greater signifi-
cance as an archetype for contract default rules that efficiently ex-
pose asymmetric information.5  
 A sophisticated line of literature examines the Hadley rule from 
an economic point of view,6 building theoretical models to determine 
whether it is efficient.7 While many variables matter, one key con-
                                                                                                                    
the jurisprudential firmament.”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Ineffi-
ciency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 734-35 (1992) (“Hadley 
continues to be one of the most analyzed contract cases in law and economics literature.”); 
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608, 616 n.21 (1998) (“Perhaps the most famous case in all of contract law, Hadley has be-
come the example that default rule theorists most often employ to illustrate their concep-
tual arguments.”). 
 3. See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.14 (3d ed., Aspen 
Publishers 2004); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 120 (4th ed., Lex-
isNexis 2001); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.5 (5th ed. 
2003). 
 4. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3; MURRAY, supra note 3; PERILLO, supra note 3. 
 5. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven 
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley 
v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Eric A. Posner, Contract Remedies: Foresee-
ability, Precaution, Causation and Mitigation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
162, 163-69 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
 6. The economic approach to contracts permeates modern literature. See ROBERT 
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 188-306 (4th ed., Pearson Addison Wesley 
2004); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 1-72, 78-222 (publishing 
various articles on this subject); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1-.15 
(6th ed. 2003); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 291-385 
(2004); 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 174, 425, 436 (Pe-
ter Newman ed., 1998). Of course, economic analysis is not the only way to understand 
contract law, and other approaches yield valuable insights. Economic analysis of contract 
law—along with the broader use of economics in the law—also receives its share of exter-
nal criticisms. For an overview of these criticisms, see BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY 
AND CONTEXT 210-13 (3d ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004); and Richard Craswell, In-
commensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998). For 
representative critiques, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 
(1993); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed 
Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1197 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 
(1987); and Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779 (1994). This Article does not address these concerns. Instead, it takes the position that 
economic analysis is one way to shape contract law and that empirical analysis remains 
relevant even when a noneconomic approach to contract law is preferred. 
 7. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5 (establishing a model for contract penalty de-
faults based on consequential damages); Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5 (developing a 
formal model of the Hadley rule); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Eco-
nomic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 636-39 (1990) (analyzing Had-
ley when sellers enjoy market power); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2 (extending Johnston’s 
analysis); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1547 (1999) (refining the Hadley model further to reflect the uncertainty of incurring 
consequential damages in breach). 
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cern is the distribution of buyer valuations for contract performance.8 
Economic theory suggests that if many buyers place a low value on 
performance while few buyers place a high value on performance (see 
Figure 1a)—and if a buyer’s valuation is private, unobservable in-
formation—then the Hadley rule may be preferable to a rule that 
awards full expectation damages.9 Under these circumstances, a 
Hadley default may force private information to be revealed in a way 
that encourages efficient precautions against breach and minimizes 
transaction costs from bargaining around the default.10 If the valua-
tion distributions are reversed (Figure 1b), the Hadley rule may be 




 Eric Posner, as part of a broader challenge to the economic analy-
sis of contract law, has recently called to question the merits of this 
Hadley model.11 He makes two arguments. First, it is simply too diffi-
cult to gather data needed to test Hadley.12 For instance, Posner 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, 
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1615, 1625 (1999) (“[I]t seems that the Hadley rule is clearly desirable for cases . . . in 
which a minority of buyers has valuations of performance that are substantially higher 
than the valuations of ordinary buyers.”). 
 9. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108-18; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 
285-86. 
 10. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108-11. A comprehensive analysis of the op-
timal default rule needs to consider additional variables, including transaction costs in-
curred by high-value and low-value buyers to contract around the default rule, efficiency 
gains from tailored precautions, the probability of incurring consequential damages, and 
several other factors. See id.; Adler, supra note 7, at 1551-53. An extended discussion of the 
Hadley solutions is found infra Part II.B. 
 11. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success 
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003) (“[T]he economic approach does not explain the 
current system of contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reform-
ing contract law.”). 
 12. Id. at 837-38. 
FIGURE 1A 
POSITIVELY SKEWED DISTRIBUTION 
FIGURE 1B 
NEGATIVELY SKEWED DISTRIBUTION 
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doubts that buyer valuations can ever be determined empirically.13 
Second, it is too hard to sum the impact of multiple variables in the 
model.14 Even if lawmakers can estimate buyer valuations, they may 
find it impossible to pick an optimal default rule because other vari-
ables—such as the transaction costs of contracting around a default, 
the efficiency gains from information revelation, and the probability 
of incurring consequential damages in breach—need to be added into 
the mix.15 In short, armchair economic theorizing is not a fruitful en-
deavor. 
 Posner’s critique echoes a broader cry for empirical analysis16 
throughout legal scholarship.17 A wide range of academics, practitio-
                                                                                                                    
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. Using a choice-of-remedies example, Richard Craswell synthesizes Posner’s 
claim as follows: 
[W]e cannot decide which remedy is “best” in any overall sense . . . unless we 
have some way of measuring the relevant effects, both good and bad, and then 
summing them to come up with a combined score for each of the possible reme-
dies. But if we lack empirical data to measure the magnitudes of the various ef-
fects, any such sum will be difficult—or even impossible—to construct, so we 
will never know which remedy is truly the most efficient. 
Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of 
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 908 (2003). 
 15. Posner, supra note 11, at 836-39. 
 16. It is important to distinguish between quantitative empirical analysis and quali-
tative empirical analysis. Broadly speaking, empirical research uses evidence about the 
world based on observation or experience. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Infer-
ence, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). In the legal literature, the term “empirical analysis” of-
ten refers more narrowly to quantitative data and statistical techniques. Id. But empirical 
analysis can also be qualitative (nonnumerical). Id. Many legal studies, of course, draw 
upon qualitative worldly observations to support a hypothesis or contention and can thus 
be considered empirical in nature. Id. at 2-3. In this sense, legal scholarship is often em-
pirical. But consistent with other legal literature, all references to empirical analysis in 
this Article, unless specified otherwise, refer to quantitative empirical analysis. 
 17. The Winter 2002 edition of The University of Chicago Law Review, for example, 
explicitly raised the topic of empirical research in the law. Exchange, Empirical Research 
and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). The provocative exchange 
debated whether the current state of empirical legal scholarship was deeply flawed and 
whether it even comported with the rules of inference that guide empirical research in the 
social and natural sciences. Id. A subtheme of the exchange was a greater need for rigorous 
empirical analysis in the law. See Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 1 (“[Law professors] 
appear to have been proceeding with little awareness of, much less compliance with, many 
of the rules of inference, and without paying heed to the key lessons of the revolution in 
empirical analysis that has been taking place over the last century in other disciplines.”); 
Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
135, 135 (2002) (opining that Epstein and King “miss the targets they seek” as “their as-
sault on legal scholarship violates many of their own rules of inference”); Jack Goldsmith 
& Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 
153-54 (2002) (“Epstein and King overlook that legal scholarship frequently pursues doc-
trinal, interpretive, and normative purposes . . . . [G]iven constraints on time, information, 
expertise, and research funds, academics face inevitable tradeoffs between rigor and accu-
racy, on the one hand, and timeliness, relevance, and utility, on the other.”); Richard L. 
Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 171 (2002) (“[I]n 
their haste to show that legal academics have failed, Epstein and King miss an important 
opportunity to explore the ways in which [legal scholarship and the social sciences] can 
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ners, and judges believe that contract law—along with other legal 
disciplines—needs greater empirical analysis to test and support 
scholarly claims.18 The shortage of quantitative empirical scholarship 
in the law is attributed to many factors: lack of training among pro-
fessors, lower prestige for empirical work, greater expense burdens, 
and a longer research process incompatible with the law’s need for 
timely insights.19 For whatever reasons, empirical analysis of con-
                                                                                                                    
contribute to [each] other.”). Around this same time, the University of Illinois Law Review 
sponsored a symposium on empirical legal research, focusing less on the quality of histori-
cal scholarship and more on the potential of future scholarship. Symposium, Empirical and 
Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791. 
 18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 210-11 (1995); Derek C. Bok, A 
Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 581-82 (1983); Ep-
stein & King, supra note 16, at 4-6; Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 
PEPP. L. REV. 807, 834 (1999) (“Our legal literature would be enriched if more academics, 
particularly law professors, became more engaged in empirical legal research and produced 
more of it.”); William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 167, 168-70 (2003) (inferring from data analysis of three journals—The Journal of 
Law and Economics, The Journal of Legal Studies, and the American Law and Economics 
Review—that empirical articles appear more frequently in economic journals than in law 
journals); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 1, 2-4. The call for more empirical research comes from all ends of the legal realm. 
See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Invest-
ment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doc-
trine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 134 (2003) (calling for more empirical data to determine 
whether NAFTA will chill efficient environmental regulation); Joseph A. Guzinski, Gov-
ernment’s Emerging Role as a Source of Empirical Information in Bankruptcy Cases, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 1998, at 8 (arguing that a lack of empirical information has hindered 
efforts to reform the bankruptcy code); Michael Korybut, Searching for Commercial Rea-
sonableness Under the Revised Article 9, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1383, 1405-06, 1457 (2002) (call-
ing for empirical data to understand the treatment of commercial unreasonableness in 
foreclosure under the revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code); Michael A. 
Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal 
Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 397 (1998) (raising a need for more empirical analysis 
in tax scholarship); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A 
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1489 (1997) (raising 
a need for greater quantitative empirical work in the context of guideline sentence ap-
peals). 
 19. See Heise, supra note 18, at 815-24 (arguing that professors’ lack of formal, nonle-
gal graduate education, lack of resources, high risk, lack of prestige, and lack of internal 
and external institutional incentives are to blame); Landes, supra note 18, at 178-80 (ana-
lyzing the effect and, at times, interplay of training, prestige, cost, and time); Julius G. 
Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489, 493 
(1985) (explaining why intellectual prestige, funding, and time, among other things, are 
factors); Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 164-65 (arguing that, in addition to 
other factors, the need for legal scholarship to provide timely guidance to the courts re-
quires information to be occasionally offered under “conditions of empirical uncertainty”); 
Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 9-10 (identifying the lack of training as one source of the 
problem). But see Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 118 (“[Legal scholars] can conduct 
first-rate [empirical] research that they can create and disseminate rapidly.”). Recent lit-
erature focuses on mitigating these shortcomings by building the institutional infrastruc-
ture needed to support empirical research in the law. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, Build-
ing an Infrastructure for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003); 
Howell E. Jackson, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321 (2003); Mat-
thew Spitzer, Evaluating Valuing Empiricism (at Law Schools), 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 328 
(2003); David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2003). It 
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tract law is in its infancy.20 And few have studied the Hadley rule 
empirically.21 
 This Article takes up the task of empirically assessing Hadley in 
three simple markets. Drawing upon willingness-to-pay research in 
the field of marketing, this Article first estimates the distribution of 
buyer valuations for a can of Coca-Cola, a piece of pound cake, and 
an ergonomic pen.22 Monte Carlo simulation, a technique developed 
by Manhattan Project scientists, is then used to model complex in-
teractions between multiple variables and the overall impact of al-
ternative default rules on social welfare.23 Ultimately, this combina-
                                                                                                                    
should be noted, however, that the number of empirical legal articles may be on the rise. A 
search for the term empirical in the title of all American law reviews published between 
1990 and 2000 revealed 231 results. Epstein & King, supra note 16, at 15-16 & 16 n.37. An 
updated search for all such articles published from 2001 to 2004 yields 216 results. This 
search was conducted in Westlaw’s Journals and Law Reviews (JLR) database on March 9, 
2005, for the term empirical in the title field.  
 20.  Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pit-
falls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1036. A recent review of empirical contracts scholarship in 
over 500 law journals from 1985 to 2000 yields just twenty-seven articles. Id. at 1036-37 & 
app. By comparison, a search in just fifteen top law journals during the years 1980-2001 
uncovers seventy-one economics-oriented articles and fifty-two noneconomics-oriented arti-
cles on contracts. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law 
Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 107 (2004) 
(analyzing the incidences of judicial citations of economic, noneconomic, and empirical con-
tract scholarship). Several commentators bemoan the low level of empirical contracts re-
search. E.g., Korobkin, supra, at 1037 (“[T]he empirical study of contract law is a very un-
derdeveloped genre of legal scholarship.”); Weintraub, supra note 18, at 4 (“Despite this 
need for data, however, to date there have been only a handful of empirical studies focus-
ing on particular contract problems and relationships . . . .”). More broadly, a recent study 
estimates that just 20.9% of all articles on common law subjects (mainly contracts, torts, 
and property) published in The Journal of Legal Studies from 1972 to 2002 were empirical. 
Landes, supra note 18, at 170 & tbl.1. By comparison, during this same time period, 55% of 
articles on crime, 52.3% of articles on procedure, and 50% of articles on public choice in the 
journal were empirical. Id. Landes also shows that empirical analysis enjoys an even 
greater use among economists outside the legal academy. For instance, 72.4% of all articles 
published in The Journal of Law and Economics (a publication largely edited by business 
professors and largely focused on scholarship outside the legal academy) during the same 
thirty-year period were empirical in nature. Id. at 168-70 & 170 tbl.1. 
 21. For existing empirical work on the Hadley doctrine, see Richard Danzig, Hadley v. 
Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 
J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989); Johnston, supra note 7, at 639-48; and Janet T. Landa, Hadley 
v. Baxendale and the Expansion of the Middleman Economy, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 455 (1987). 
 22. The buyer valuation estimations for these products are developed from marketing re-
search by Klaus Wertenbroch and Bernd Skiera in Measuring Consumers’ Willingness to Pay at 
the Point of Purchase, 39 J. MARKETING RES. 228 (2002). For additional research on the willing-
ness-to-pay methodology, see Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, How Much Are Customers Will-
ing to Pay?, MARKETING RES., Winter 2002, at 20; and HENRIK SATTLER & FRANZISKA VÖLCKNER, 
METHODS FOR MEASURING CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY (Inst. of Mktg., Retailing & Mgmt. 
Sci. at the Univ. of Hamburg, Research Papers on Marketing and Retailing No. 009, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.henriksattler.de/publikationen/HS_FV_WillingnesstoPay.pdf. 
 23. On the links between Monte Carlo simulation and the Manhattan Project, see 
Roger Eckhardt, Stan Ulam, John Von Neuman, and the Monte Carlo Method, 15 LOS 
ALAMOS SCI. 131 (1987). For general background regarding Monte Carlo simulation, see 
2005]      EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING HADLEY V. BAXENDALE 903 
 
tion of empirical and assumption-based analysis yields several im-
portant insights. 
 The primary claim of this Article is that a Hadley default rule is 
more efficient than a full-damages default rule in the simple markets 
studied. The extended claim is that markets with similar conditions 
might also benefit from the Hadley rule. However, these findings are 
subject to four important qualifications. First, the Hadley rule is not 
preferable when high-value buyers systematically have a much 
greater chance of incurring consequential damages. Second, a full-
damages default outperforms Hadley when most of the efficiency 
gains from information revelation go to low-value buyers. Third, the 
Hadley rule is not optimal when the transaction costs of contracting 
around the default rule are much greater for high-value buyers than 
low-value buyers. Finally, the analysis assumes perfect competition, 
and introducing seller power into the empirical model might change 
the results. 
 The discussion is organized as follows. Part II reviews the Hadley 
literature, including the concern that economic models of Hadley are 
indeterminate. Part III launches an empirical case study of the Had-
ley rule. More specifically, Part III.A develops a working model of 
Hadley from the existing economic literature, and Part III.B uses 
willingness-to-pay data to empirically estimate buyer valuations for 
three simple markets. Part III.C combines this work with other vari-
ables to arrive at preliminary conclusions for each market. Part III.D 
qualifies the findings by conducting sensitivity analysis. Part IV pro-
poses additional research to test the Hadley rule in more complicated 
markets. Finally, Part V suggests that the field of marketing may be 
a ready-made source of data for contract law scholars. If so, it might 
be premature to abandon empirical testing of economic theories, at 
least for the question of consequential damage defaults. A brief con-
clusion summarizes the results. 
II.   THE HADLEY PROBLEM 
A.   The Significance of a British Miller 
 The classic contracts case Hadley v. Baxendale24 denies recovery 
for unforeseeable consequential damages, that is, nonstandard dam-
ages beyond contemplation of the promisor at the time of contract-
ing.25 Hadley, a British mill operator, contracted with Baxendale to 
                                                                                                                    
JAMES E. GENTLE, RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION AND MONTE CARLO METHODS (2d ed. 
2003); PETER JÄCKEL, MONTE CARLO METHODS IN FINANCE (2002); and ISTVÁN MANNO, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE MONTE-CARLO METHOD (1999). 
 24. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
 25. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14, at 255-57; MURRAY, supra note 3, § 120, at 
783-85; PERILLO, supra note 3, § 14.5, at 569.  
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deliver a broken shaft to a manufacturer, who needed the shaft as a 
model to make the replacement.26 Unfortunately, Baxendale was de-
layed, and the mill shut down for five days.27 The court denied Had-
ley compensation for profits lost during this time period because they 
were unforeseeable consequential damages.28 
 The case has come to represent an important limit to the general 
rule awarding full expectation damages for breach.29 Damages are 
divided into two types, general and consequential. General damages, 
arising naturally in the usual course of breach, are routinely recov-
erable.30 Consequential damages, such as Hadley’s lost profits, are 
not recoverable unless the loss is foreseeable at the time of contract-
ing or the parties make alternative arrangements.31 In other words, 
Hadley is a default rule that takes effect only when a contract is si-
lent on the issue of consequential damages. Parties can contract 
around it if they wish.32 
 Much of contract theory deals with this concept of selecting ap-
propriate default rules to govern incomplete contracts.33 Parties can-
not possibly anticipate everything that might happen over the course 
of a contract. Even if they could, the costs of negotiating every con-
                                                                                                                    
 26. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146.  
 27. Id.  
 28. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14. 
 29. The Hadley rule receives widespread acceptance. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts adopts the rule as follows: “Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party 
in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the con-
tract was made.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979). Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) codifies Hadley. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2003). The United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods limits damages to losses 
that the breaching party “foresaw or ought to have foreseen . . . as a possible consequence 
of the breach of contract.” United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 74, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 30. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14, at 256. 
 31. Id. at 257, 259, 268. 
 32. In fact, many commercial contracts apparently modify this default rule to disclaim 
liability for all consequential damages, whether foreseeable or not. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD 
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 281 n.16 (1994); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.14, 
at 268. Richard Epstein puts it this way: 
All in all, the optimal contracting strategy does not appear to call for the high 
consequential damages, subject to defense rules, that courts have tended to 
adopt. . . . [W]ithin the class of fixed damage awards, there is reason to expect 
these damages to be kept relatively limited, which is what the express con-
tracts have typically provided. 
Epstein, supra note 21, at 118. See also infra note 49 (exploring UCC drafting committee 
discussions to abandon the Hadley default rule for this reason). 
 33. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1547 (“At the center of contract theory is the role 
of default rules.”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in 3 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 1; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and 
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985). 
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tingency may outweigh the benefits of planning for small-probability 
events. As a result, no one drafts a complete contract.34 
 The law faces a choice, then, when parties to a contract come 
across a contingency not addressed by the initial agreement. One op-
tion is to dismiss the contract entirely, expunging all contractual li-
ability because the parties have not sufficiently stated a binding 
agreement.35 A second option is to fill these contractual gaps some-
how and enforce the enhanced contract instead.36 Economic analysis 
claims to offer a basis for choosing efficient default rules to govern 
incomplete contracts. 
 One way to select a default rule is to simply choose the term that 
most parties would prefer at the time of contracting.37 This majori-
tarian approach to default rules allows the law to economize on 
transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that parties 
                                                                                                                    
 34. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 211-17; SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 299-301; 
Craswell, supra note 33. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently put it this way: 
“[C]ontracts will inevitably be incomplete. There is an infinite number of possible future 
states and a very large set of possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and 
partner types is infinite and contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties 
cannot write contracts about everything.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract The-
ory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-95 (2003). Parties may also 
remain silent for a number of strategic reasons. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 94; 
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 760; Johnston, supra note 7. 
 35. Such is the approach taken in a number of classic common law cases. See, e.g., 
Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916) (holding a promise to give a “fair share of 
[the] profits” sufficiently vague to render the contract unenforceable). The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts offers some support for this approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1979) (“Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be 
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of 
the contract are reasonably certain.”); id. § 33 cmt. b (“Contracts should be made by the 
parties, not by the courts, and hence . . . remedies for breach of contract must have a basis 
in the agreement of the parties.”); see also Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing In-
definite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1643-61 (2003) (exploring situations where 
courts refuse to enforce incomplete contracts). 
 36. This approach receives support from the Uniform Commercial Code, which often 
seeks to supplement incomplete contracts with fair or reasonable terms, especially when 
parties fail to specify less important terms. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2003) (inserting a 
reasonable price when none is specified). For more general discussion, see Richard E. Spei-
del, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 785 
(1982). Other compromise approaches to enforcing incomplete contracts have also been 
suggested. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately 
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389 (suggesting an intermediate solution, in some 
circumstances, which holds parties partially accountable to honor incomplete contracts). 
 37. Craswell, supra note 33, at 2-5; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitiga-
tion Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 
(1983). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that lawmakers should supply an 
essential missing term with one “which is reasonable in the circumstances.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979). It has been suggested that this leads to the use of 
majoritarian defaults. See Speidel, supra note 36; see also U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2003) (“[A] 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a con-
tract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”). 
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would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement.38 While it may 
be fiction to retroactively divine the parties’ intentions, economists 
can often reason that one term would have been selected over alter-
natives. Perhaps one party can better manage the risk, for example, 
or avoid costs easier.39 By generalizing the preferences of many con-
tracting parties in this manner—or even by looking historically at a 
large number of executed contracts—lawmakers could conceivably 
judge which default rules will minimize transaction costs.40 
 But, unfortunately, selecting default rules by majority preference 
may not always lead to the most efficient outcome. A second strain of 
economic theory suggests that lawmakers should, instead, sometimes 
choose default rules preferred by a minority of parties.41 The reason 
is this: minority defaults can, at times, lead to information sharing 
that increases the overall welfare of an economic system.42 Selecting 
the right default can prevent better-informed parties from taking ad-
vantage of less-informed parties by compelling information to come 
forward that results in a greater social welfare.43 
 From an economic point of view, then, one key challenge is know-
ing whether to choose majoritarian defaults that save on transaction 
costs or to choose penalty defaults that force information to be 
shared. This tension plays out most directly in the economic litera-
ture evaluating Hadley.44 In fact, over time, the Hadley rule has 
                                                                                                                    
 38. POSNER, supra note 6, § 4.1, at 96-97; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (“The legal 
rule [of limited liability] enables firms to obtain . . . benefits . . . at lower cost.”). 
 39. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 254-56 (2004); Goetz & 
Scott, supra note 37, at 971-76. For an example of this in practice, see National Distillers 
& Chemical Corp. v. First National Bank of Highland Park, 804 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 
1986), reasoning that “[a]mbiguities and gaps in contracts should be resolved by finding 
what the parties would have bargained for had they addressed the matter explicitly at the 
time.” 
 40. But see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1272 (2003) (suggesting that behavioral economic effects may cause contract de-
fault rules to be “sticky,” preventing parties from efficiently contracting around the rules in 
some cases); Korobkin, supra note 2, passim (suggesting that default rule preferences of 
contracting parties may be influenced by the existing default rule). 
 41. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 93-95; Craswell, supra note 33, at 5-9. 
 42. The intuition behind these penalty defaults, or “information-forcing defaults,” is to 
keep better-informed parties from strategically hiding socially valuable information during 
contract formation. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 94. To get the information out, “it 
may be efficient to choose a rule that a majority of people actually disfavor.” Id. at 95; see 
also Gwyn D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1125 (1988) (discussing cross-subsidization problems that result when better informed par-
ties keep information private). 
 43. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 94, 99. This point is developed further infra 
Parts II.B.1-2. 
 44. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 101-04; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 
5, at 284-87. 
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taken on much greater significance as an archetype for the power of 
contract default rules to efficiently expose asymmetric information.45 
B.   Theoretical “Solutions” to Hadley 
 The Hadley situation is usually modeled by dividing a population 
of buyers into two classes: those with a low valuation of contract per-
formance and those with a high valuation.46 For example, purchasers 
of FedEx delivery services might be divided between buyers valuing 
delivery greatly (perhaps they need to deliver important documents 
to buy a house or apply for a job) and buyers with a low valuation of 
performance (perhaps they need to send a newsletter or another rou-
tine document). Each buyer is risk-neutral and knows his valuation 
type. The selling party has no way to distinguish one type of buyer 
from the other and must rely instead on the buyer to reveal this pri-
vate information. From a social point of view, it is desirable for sell-
ers to know this information so they can take efficient precautions.47 
For example, using the facts of Hadley, the carrier could hire another 
employee to ensure timely delivery for the highest-value buyers.48 
While many default rules might govern the issue of consequential 
damages,49 two alternative rules are proposed: (1) a Hadley default 
limiting unforeseeable consequential damages unless high-value 
buyers reveal their type and (2) a full-damages default allowing high-
value buyers to recover everything without revealing any informa-
                                                                                                                    
 45. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1548-53; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 101-04; 
Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 286. More generally, contracting under asymmetrical 
information receives extensive treatment in the literature on game theory and the law. 
See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 32, at 79-158. 
 46. A more realistic approach might be to model the value of performance by the two 
classes of buyers as two continuous distributions with different means. Such an approach 
is suggested by Adler, supra note 7, at 1561 n.38. This Article extends the analysis in this 
manner. See infra Part III. 
 47. The model thus assumes that spending more on precautions will reduce the risk of 
breach and therefore the expected damages suffered by each buyer for nonperformance. 
Said another way, if the low-value and high-value buyers were conducting these activities 
themselves, they would each take different levels of care, which would reflect the optimal 
investments to reduce the risk of nonperformance. Other things being equal, one would 
prefer a default rule that leads to identical results. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 32, at 150-
51; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 97-104; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 287-92. 
 48. This might make sense if the costs of hiring the extra employee were more than 
offset by the benefits of a greater chance of timely delivery to Hadley. One can also imagine 
an inefficient investment in precautions—for example, hiring ten police to fend off an un-
likely attempt at highway robbery. Such an investment might result in a price greater 
than what Hadley is willing to pay and is unlikely to occur once full negotiations have 
taken place. 
 49. For example, some members of the drafting committee for the 2003 amendments 
to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code considered imposing a default rule denying 
recovery of all consequential damages from breach. Interview with William Henning, For-
mer Chair, Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 2, in Tuscaloosa, Ala. (June 16, 
2004). This discussion did not lead to a formal draft proposal, and amended Article 2 leaves 
the Hadley rule in place. Id. 
908  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:897 
 
tion.50 Which default rule will allow sellers to distinguish between 
buyer types, thus enabling them to take efficient precautions that 
maximize social welfare?51 
1.   The Majoritarian Solution 
 A lawmaker might argue that the Hadley default is preferable be-
cause it forces high-value buyers to reveal their type by negotiating 
protection for unforeseeable consequential damages.52 Of course, 
high-value buyers may initially resist disclosing this information to 
avoid a price increase. But as long as sellers are best situated to in-
                                                                                                                    
 50. E.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1554-59; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108; 
Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 289-92. 
 51. The concept of greater social efficiency through more tailored precautions can be 
illustrated with a simple numerical example. Take a population of 100 buyers with a posi-
tively skewed distribution of performance valuations as follows (Figure 1a, supra p. 899, 
displays this data visually): 
 
VALUE PLACED ON 
PERFORMANCE 



















If sellers cannot distinguish among the types of buyers, they will take precautions reflect-
ing the mean performance valuation of 5.1. However, if they can divide the buyers into just 
two groups—those above the mean and those below the mean—then they can take precau-
tions reflecting a mean value of 3.2 for the 65 low-value buyers and precautions reflecting 
a mean value of 8.7 for the 35 high-value buyers. More granular knowledge of the perform-
ance valuations for different buyer classes results in two main benefits. First, sellers can 
avoid wasting precautions on the 65 low-value buyers who would prefer a lower price and 
higher chance of breach. Second, sellers can take additional precautions—greater than the 
average levels taken when all buyers are pooled together—to increase the probability of 
successful performance for the 35 high-value buyers. Social gains will continue to accrue 
with increasing levels of granularity (for example, subdividing the two groups of buyers 
into groups of four, eight, or ultimately down to groups of fifteen). Of course, these gains 
may be offset by the increased transaction costs needed to obtain this granularity. 
 52. See Posner, supra note 11, at 836-37. 
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vest in extra precautions,53 high-value buyers will realize that they 
are better off paying the higher price and enjoying greater certainty 
of performance. 
 But what happens if a full-damages default rule is adopted instead? 
Now, high-value buyers will be compensated fully and need not reveal 
their special circumstances.54 Low-value buyers, however, will prefer 
that sellers take fewer precautions in exchange for a cheaper price.55 
They will step forward to reveal this preference, allowing sellers to 
again distinguish between buyer types and take more granular precau-
tions.56 Thus, in theory, either the Hadley or the full-damages default 
rule will expose private information and lead to efficient precautions. 
 Under a majoritarian approach, then, the optimal default rule is 
simply a function of the underlying valuation distribution for the 
market. The most efficient rule seeks only to minimize transaction 
costs by putting in place a default that most buyers need not contract 
around.57 Lawmakers should estimate the buyer valuation distribu-
tion for the market and select the default rule accordingly: if buyer 
valuations skew positively (Figure 1a58), then a Hadley rule is best; if 
they skew negatively (Figure 1b59), then a full-damages default 
should be chosen. And if buyer valuations are normally distributed, 
the consequential damages default rule may not matter.60 
2.   The Penalty Default Solution 
 In some cases, however, a Hadley default can be better even when 
most buyers would not select this rule in advance. The logic is subtle: 
majority defaults may not lead buyers to reveal their type, while a 
penalty default rule—reflecting the preferences of fewer buyers—
may expose this information.61 
 This can happen because the majoritarian model of Hadley assumes 
away important variables. For instance, the optimal default rule may depend 
on the magnitude of transaction costs—the costs of contracting around a dis-
liked default rule.62 Or the best rule may change if low-value and high-value 
                                                                                                                    
 53. One would expect this to be true in many cases. However, independent insurance 
markets, allowing buyers to self-insure if they wish, might exist for some types of con-
tracts. This is ultimately another issue subject to empirical investigation. 
 54. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 7-8; Posner, supra note 11, at 836-37. 
 55. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 7-8; Posner, supra note 11, at 837. 
 56. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 7-8; Posner, supra note 11, at 837. 
 57. This analysis follows from Coasean contractual theory. See R.H. Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Johnston, supra note 7, at 623-25. 
 58. See supra p. 899 fig.1a.  
 59. See supra p. 899 fig.1b.  
 60. Posner, supra note 11, at 854. 
 61. Adler, supra note 7, at 1549-50; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 97-98; Bebchuk 
& Shavell, supra note 5, at 290. 
 62. A majoritarian default might be appropriate if transaction costs are so small that 
everyone contracts around inefficient defaults or so large that no one does so. See Ayres & 
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buyers face different transaction costs.63 The optimal default might also turn 
on which buyers benefit the most from tailored precautions.64 
 Consider a situation where the majoritarian default leads to a poor out-
come. Assume that a legal system selects a full-damages default to govern 
the negatively skewed market shown in Figure 1b.65 This default is majori-
tarian because there are 65 high-value buyers who prefer a full-damages 
rule and just 35 low-value buyers. But the transaction costs incurred by 
low-value buyers to contract around the full-damages default may out-
weigh the gains that they receive from the seller taking fewer precautions. 
If so, low-value buyers will not reveal their type, and sellers will take aver-
age precautions for the entire buyer pool rather than more efficient tailored 
precautions. By contrast, this problem may not occur if lawmakers select a 
Hadley default. If the gains from high-value buyers contracting around the 
Hadley default rule sufficiently outweigh the transaction costs incurred, 
then they will reveal their type. Under these circumstances, a default rule 
preferred by a minority of buyers leads to greater social welfare, while a de-
fault rule preferred by the majority is less efficient. 
 A stylized numerical example may help illustrate this point.66 Under 
this example, simplify the market in Figure 1b67 even further so that 
there are 35 identical low-value buyers and 65 identical high-value buy-
ers, and make the assumptions of Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
BUYER ASSUMPTIONS IN A NEGATIVELY SKEWED MARKET 
BUYER TYPE NUMBER VALUATION ($) 
COST TO CONTRACT 
AROUND DEFAULT ($) 
Low 35 50 15 
High 65 500 10 
Average  342.568  
 
                                                                                                                    
Gertner, supra note 5, at 114-15. But this need not be the case, and robust models will ex-
plicitly take transaction cost variables into account. Id. at 117-18; see also Alan Schwartz 
& Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 3 
(2004) (noting that “contracting and renegotiation costs are treated as exogenous parame-
ters, commonly assumed to be either very high or very low” and then “explor[ing] the mid-
dle ground”). 
 63. Korobkin also explores this point. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1058. 
 64. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 116-18.  
 65. See supra p. 899 fig.1b. The distribution of buyer valuations for this market is the 
inverse of the one described supra note 51. 
 66. This example is adapted from the framework established by Bebchuk and Shavell. 
See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 287-90 nn.9-17. Perfect competition is assumed, 
and all seller costs except precautions are excluded for simplicity. 
 67. See supra p. 899 fig.1b.  
 68. This value is the weighted average of the low-value and high-value buyer valua-
tions: (.35 * 50) + (.65 * 500) = 342.5. 
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 Assume further that sellers in a perfectly competitive market 
can choose from three different levels of precautions, as indicated in 
Table 2. Taking greater precautions increases the chances that sell-
ers will successfully perform the contract, but doing so also costs 
more. For example, sellers taking medium precautions incur $25 in 
costs—which they pass on to buyers in perfect competition—and 
these precautions lead to successful contract performance 60% of 
the time. 
TABLE 2 




PERFORMING CONTRACT (%) 
COST OF TAKING 
PRECAUTION ($) 
Low 40 5 
Medium 60 25 
High 80 100 
 
 With these assumptions, low-value buyers prefer contracts where 
sellers take low precautions:69 
 Utilitylow = 50 (40%) – 5 = 15 
 Utilitymed = 50 (60%) – 25 = 5 
 Utilityhigh = 50 (80%) – 100 = -60 
Conversely, high-value buyers prefer contracts where sellers take 
high precautions: 
 Utilitylow = 500 (40%) – 5 = 195 
 Utilitymed = 500 (60%) – 25 = 275 
 Utilityhigh = 500 (80%) – 100 = 300 
And if sellers cannot distinguish buyer types, they will take medium 
precautions, reflecting average expected preferences: 
 Utilitylow = 342.5 (40%) – 5 = 132 
 Utilitymed = 342.5 (60%) – 25 = 180.5 
 Utilityhigh = 342.5 (80%) – 100 = 174 
 Now imagine that this legal system selects the majoritarian de-
fault rule of full damages. High-value buyers have no need to con-
tract around this rule because they will be fully compensated un-
der the default.70 But low-value buyers may choose to reveal their 
type for a cheaper price.71 Will the economic system benefit if they 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Buyer utility = [(valuation of successful performance) * (probability of successful 
performance)] - cost of precautions. 
 70. See Posner, supra note 11, at 836-37. 
 71. Id. at 837.  
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do so? Consider the social welfare in each possible outcome (Table 
3). 
TABLE 3 
SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER FULL-DAMAGES DEFAULT RULE 






Low-value buyers contract 
around default (separat-
ing72) 
073 19,50074 19,500 
Low-value buyers do not 
contract around default 
(pooling75) 
17576 17,87577 18,050* 
* Equilibrium result 
 
 If low-value buyers incur the costs of contracting around the 
rule, the buyer population separates by type. Low-value buyers re-
ceive low precautions and high-value buyers receive high precau-
tions (without incurring transaction costs). Conversely, if low-
value buyers do not reveal their type, the population pools and 
everyone receives medium precautions. Society is better off when 
low-value buyers contract around the default rule (19,500 > 
18,050), but they will not do so. Each low-value buyer faces a cost 
of $15 to contract around the rule yet only benefits by $10—the 
difference between utility with low precautions and utility with 
medium precautions. The equilibrium is a pooling one where no 
one reveals information. 
 In this example, however, the results change when the Hadley de-
fault is selected, even though fewer buyers prefer this rule. Now the 
65 high-value buyers must decide whether to reveal their type. Con-
                                                                                                                    
 72. A separating equilibrium occurs when one group of buyers offers information 
about their type, thus allowing the seller to distinguish between the groups of buyers and 
take tailored precautions. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1557-58; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 
5, at 111-23.  
 73. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * 
(utility to low-value buyer with low precautions – cost to low-value buyer of contracting 
around default) = (35) * (15 - 15) = 0. Thus, in this context, social welfare is the sum of par-
ticipant utility and excludes third-party effects. 
 74. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * 
(utility to high-value buyer with high precautions) = (65) * (300) = 19,500. 
 75. A pooling equilibrium occurs when no buyer group offers information about their 
type, thus forcing the seller to take the same level of precautions for the entire buyer 
“pool.” See Adler, supra note 7, at 1556; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 111-13.  
 76. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * (utility 
to low-value buyer with medium precautions) = (35) * (5) = 175. 
 77. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * (util-
ity to high-value buyer with medium precautions) = (65) * (275) = 17,875. 
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sider the resulting social welfare under both outcomes as shown in 
Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER HADLEY DEFAULT RULE 
 SOCIAL WELFARE 





tract around default (sepa-
rating) 
52578 18,85079 19,375* 
High-value buyers do not 
contract around default 
(pooling) 
17580 17,87581 18,050 
* Equilibrium result 
 
 Social welfare is greater when high-value buyers contract around 
the Hadley default rule (19,375 > 18,050), and they will do so. The 
increase in utility when they move from medium precautions to high 
precautions, a net gain of $25, outweighs the transaction costs of $10. 
While the greatest social welfare comes when low-value buyers con-
tract around a full-damages default,82 this outcome never occurs. 
Hadley thus offers the best obtainable outcome. 
 This example illustrates how self-interested buyer behavior some-
times prevents majoritarian defaults from exposing socially valuable 
information. Different assumptions, of course, might support majori-
tarian defaults.83 The penalty-default solution to Hadley argues that 
limited consequential damages should sometimes be imposed to force 
efficient precautions, even though the rule may be preferred by few 
contracting parties. This means that lawmakers considering the 
                                                                                                                    
 78. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * (utility 
to low-value buyer with low precautions) = (35) * (15) = 525. 
 79. This social welfare is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * (util-
ity to high-value buyer with high precautions – cost to high-value buyer of contracting 
around default) = (65) * (300 - 10) = 18,850. 
 80. Calculated as in supra note 76. 
 81. Calculated as in supra note 77. 
 82. This is true because total transaction costs incurred when low-value buyers contract 
around the default (35 * 15 = 525) are less than the total transaction costs incurred when high-
value buyers do so (65 * 10 = 650). Cf. Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 5, at 288-89, 295 (discuss-
ing socially optimal behavior of buyers and sellers where, in contrast to this model, contracting 
high-buyers have lower transaction costs because they are in the minority). This need not al-
ways be the case. If, for example, transaction costs of high-value buyers are reduced to $5, the 
resulting welfare when they contract around the Hadley default is 19,700—which exceeds the 
social welfare when low-value buyers contract around the full-damages default. 
 83. For example, reducing transaction costs for low-value buyers to $5 would cause 
them to separate in a full-damages regime. A majoritarian default thus results in the most 
efficient outcome. 
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Hadley rule ought to analyze more than just the number of high-
value and low-value buyers in a market. Additional buyer data—
including the magnitude of performance valuations, costs incurred 
when contracting for other rules, and efficiency gains from tailored 
precautions—are needed to select the better default rule. 
3.   Introducing Stochastic Damages 
 The solution gets more complicated, however, when consequential 
damages are stochastic (occurring with some probability) instead of 
certain.84 Using the facts of Hadley, imagine, for example, that there 
was only some chance that the miller would lose profits from a de-
layed delivery—maybe he was searching neighboring mills for a 
spare shaft.85 Barry Adler recently modeled this nuance,86 finding 
that the change narrows the circumstances where penalty defaults 
lead to the optimal outcome.87 A few changes to the previous example 
are reflected in Table 5, which will illustrate this point. 
TABLE 5 
























Low 35 25 75 60 15 
High 65 25 475 90 10 
Average  25 33589 79.5  
 Buyer valuation is now split between general damages and conse-
quential damages, and the Hadley rule is modeled differently. Conse-
quential damages incurred by low-value buyers are considered fore-
seeable and, thus, recoverable under Hadley.90 Consequential damages 
beyond this amount are unforeseeable. High- and low-value buyers 
                                                                                                                    
 84. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1560. 
 85. Or, to borrow from Adler, imagine that Hadley hired a mechanic who had a 
chance to fix the mill without the missing mill shaft. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1561-70. 
 88. For simplicity, this probability of incurring consequential damages is modeled 
with certainty. Cf. id. at 1561 n.38 (using a simplified presentation to convey the general 
idea). The working model used infra Part III.A models this variable stochastically. 
 89. This value is the weighted average of the low-value and high-value buyer conse-
quential damages: (.35 * 75) + (.65 * 475) = 335. Similarly, the average probability of incur-
ring consequential damages is the weighted probability of low- and high-value buyers. 
 90. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1562. 
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also have different chances of suffering consequential damages. 
 In this stylized example, then, the first $75 in consequential dam-
ages is foreseeable, while the incremental $400 incurred by high-value 
buyers is not. High-value buyers also suffer damages with greater prob-
ability. Assumptions for seller precautions remain the same. 
 With this modeling refinement, high-value buyers are more likely 
to conceal their type inefficiently, even under a Hadley default. As 
before, low-value buyers prefer contracts where sellers take low pre-
cautions,91 high-value buyers prefer contracts where sellers take high 
precautions,92 and sellers take medium precautions when they are 
unable to distinguish buyer type.93 Under a full-damages regime, the 
outcome mirrors the earlier example. Table 6 illustrates this point.  
TABLE 6 
REVISED SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER FULL-DAMAGES DEFAULT RULE 






Low-value buyers contract around 
default (separating) 
28094 17,03095 17,310 
Low-value buyers do not contract 
around default (pooling) 
59596 16,02397 16,618* 
* Equilibrium result 
 
                                                                                                                    
 91. The calculation here is slightly more complicated, as buyer utility under each pre-
caution level now depends on the probability of consequential damages occurring. Thus, the 
equation for buyer utility is as follows: [probability of no consequential damages * ((general 
damages * the probability of successful performance) – the cost of precautions)] + [probability 
of consequential damages * (((general damages + consequential damages) * the probability of 
successful performance) – the cost of precautions)]. Using this formula for low-value buyers,  
   Utilitylow = [40% * ((25 * 40%) - 5)] + [60% * (((25 + 75) * 40%) - 5)] = 23 
   Utilitymed = 17 
   Utilityhigh = -44 
 92. For high-value buyers, 
   Utilitylow = [10% * ((25 * 40%) - 5)] + [90% * ((25 + 475) * 40%) - 5)] = 176 
   Utilitymed = 246.5 
   Utilityhigh = 262 
 93. For average buyers, 
   Utilitylow = [20.5% * ((25 * 40%) - 5)] + [79.5% * (((25 + 335) * 40%) - 5)] = 111.5 
   Utilitymed = 149.8 
   Utilityhigh = 133.1 
 94. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * 
(value to low-value buyer with low precautions – cost to low-value buyer of contracting 
around default) = (35) * (23 - 15) = 280. 
 95. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * 
(value to high-value buyer with high precautions) = (65) * (262) = 17,030. 
 96. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * 
(value to low-value buyer with medium precautions) = (35) * (17) = 595. 
 97. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * 
(value to high-value buyer with medium precautions) = (65) * (246.5) = 16,023. 
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 Social welfare is greater if low-value buyers separate (17,310 > 
16,618), but instead they will pool. Transaction costs of $15 exceed the 
net benefit of $6 that accrues to low-value buyers moving from me-
dium to low precautions.98 
 In the earlier example, instituting a Hadley default resulted in a 
switch from a pooling equilibrium to a separating one. But this time, 
changing the default rule will not cause separation. Clearly, social welfare 
is again greater with buyer separation, as Table 7 illustrates. Further-
more, the gains to high-value buyers moving from medium to high pre-
cautions ($15.5) exceed the transaction costs of contracting around the de-
fault rule ($10).99 But high-value buyers must now pay an additional cost 
if they identify their type: sellers will charge them for the higher probabil-
ity of incurring the initial $75 in consequential damages.100 In this exam-
ple, high-value buyers pay an extra $7.88 when identifying their type.101 
Facing this calculus, high-value buyers keep quiet;102 this results in a 
pooling equilibrium—even with the Hadley rule.  
TABLE 7 
REVISED SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER HADLEY DEFAULT RULE 






High-value buyers contract around de-
fault (separating) 
805103 16,380104 17,185 
High-value buyers do not contract 
around default (pooling) 
595105 16,023106 16,618* 
* Equilibrium result 
 This does not mean that penalty defaults never work.107 It means 
only that they may work less frequently than otherwise believed.108 A 
                                                                                                                    
 98. See supra p. 914 tbl.5 and note 91.  
 99. See supra p. 914 tbl.5 and note 92.  
 100. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1565-66 (describing a similar scenario between ship-
pers and carriers). 
 101. This additional cost is calculated as follows: (probability of consequential damages 
for high-value buyers – probability of consequential damages for average buyers) * foresee-
able consequential damages = (90% - 79.5%) * 75 = 7.88. 
 102. $15.50 in benefits < $17.88 in total costs. 
 103. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of low-value buyers) * 
(value to low-value buyer with low precautions) = (35) * (23) = 805. 
 104. This social welfare value is calculated as follows: (number of high-value buyers) * 
(value to high-value buyer with high precautions – cost to high-value buyers of contracting 
around default) = (65) * (262 - 10) = 16,380. 
 105. This social welfare value is calculated as in supra note 96. 
 106. This social welfare value is calculated as in supra note 97. 
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nuanced model of Hadley, then, needs to add variables for the 
chances that high-value and low-value buyers will incur consequen-
tial damages. 
 In summary, the choice of a default rule to govern consequential 
damages depends on several variables, including (1) the magnitude 
and distribution of valuations that buyers place on contract perform-
ance;109 (2) the transaction costs incurred when high-value buyers 
bargain around a Hadley default or when low-value buyers bargain 
around a full-damages default;110 (3) the social efficiency gains when 
high- or low-value buyers disclose private information, thus enabling 
more tailored precautions against breach;111 and (4) the probability 
that high-value or low-value buyers will incur consequential dam-
ages in breach.112 Given this complexity, it may be difficult for law-
makers to unpack these variables and determine which default rule 
should apply in any given context. One commentator has remarked 
that “accurate evaluation of a penalty-default rule’s efficacy in the 
Hadley setting could be a heroic task.”113 
C.   The Indeterminacy Concern with Economic Contracts 
Scholarship 
 Eric Posner takes the argument further, suggesting that complex 
economic models of contract law—including the Hadley model for 
consequential damages—are indeterminate.114 In his view, economic 
analysis of contract law has become so complicated that the theories 
do not lead to observable implications or concrete normative sugges-
tions. The argument is twofold. First, key variables in the economic 
                                                                                                                    
 107. To see this in the example, change low-value buyer consequential damages from 
$75 to $25. With this modified assumption, the gains to high-value buyers from identifying 
themselves outweigh the costs of doing so, and buyers separate under the Hadley rule. 
 108. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1551-54. Responses to Adler’s article echo this belief. 
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 92-93; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 8, at 1618-19. 
 109. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 101-02. 
 110. See id. at 97-100. 
 111. See Bebchuck & Shavell, supra note 5, at 287-89. 
 112. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1560. Other refinements to the model are possible. 
Most notably, Jason Scott Johnston has introduced a game theoretical model of the Hadley 
rule where he relaxes assumptions of perfectly competitive markets. See Johnston, supra 
note 7, at 626-39. In other words, sellers are no longer “identical price-taking firms.” Id. at 
625. This introduces an incentive for sellers to learn about buyer valuations, not for the 
purpose of taking efficient precautions but rather to increase their individual profits. Id. at 
625-26. It also introduces another dimension of information revelation, as buyers would 
now like to learn whether different sellers have different probabilities of breach. See id. at 
625-26. Other commentators emphasize the complications of crafting defaults in markets 
with seller power. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 732-33; Alan Schwartz, The De-
fault Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 397-99 
(1993).  
 113. Adler, supra note 7, at 1552. 
 114. See Posner, supra note 11, at 830. 
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models cannot be estimated with any degree of confidence.115 Second, 
even if one variable can be measured in isolation, there is no way to 
aggregate all of a model’s variables to obtain meaningful outcomes.116 
Take each argument in turn. 
 The first claim is that key variables are too hard to measure. In 
other words, “we [do not] have enough empirical data to be able to 
guess which rule is based on assumptions that are closer to real-
ity.”117 For Hadley, an example of an indeterminate variable might be 
the distribution of buyer valuations. How could lawmakers ever es-
timate the range of values for a given contract? What is the relevant 
population? How would they gather a sample? Why would partici-
pants ever feel compelled to reveal their actual valuation?118 If there 
is truly no way to estimate this variable empirically, then it may be 
impossible to state an optimal default rule for consequential dam-
ages. 
 More generally, if most economic models of contract law contain 
unverifiable terms, then economic analysis may be of little use. Mod-
els lacking a basis for empirical testing will ultimately fail to provide 
guidance to lawmakers. Even if more sophisticated models refine the 
variables and circumstances under which different default rules are 
preferable, they will remain indeterminate. Other approaches are 
needed to fill contract gaps at a more granular level.119 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Id. at 864-65. 
 116. Id. at 865. 
 117. Id. at 837. 
 118. Posner concludes that “[n]o one has tried to determine the shape of this distribu-
tion through empirical research, and indeed it is hard to imagine how this could be done.” 
Id. at 854. Barry Adler puts it this way: “A determination [of the optimal default rule] de-
pends on perhaps unobtainable information about the full range of each type’s [(high-value 
and low-value buyers)] expected damages from breach.” Adler, supra note 7, at 1552. 
 119. Or maybe contract gaps should not be filled at all. Alan Schwartz and Robert 
Scott suggest that lawmakers should dismiss contracts that run into contingencies not 
spelled out explicitly, at least for contracts between sophisticated parties. See Schwartz & 
Scott, supra note 34, at 594-609. They support this approach by arguing that most state-
imposed default rules are inefficient and do not address the myriad of situations that occur 
in contract law. See id. at 598-601. Instead of lowering transaction costs, these rules may 
force parties to contract around the defaults and raise the overall costs of contracting. See 
id. at 608; Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85 (2003) (stat-
ing that if parties do not like a legislatively enacted term, they will “expend resources 
drafting their own term[s]”). The buyer and seller would then be free to renegotiate terms 
or abandon the deal entirely. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 34, at 594-609. Ultimately, the 
parties might come to understand the consequences of this approach and adjust their con-
tracting strategies accordingly. Id. Of course, this refusal to set default rules would itself 
be a type of default rule. Richard Craswell puts it this way: 
The law could, of course, simply refuse to enforce any contract . . . that fell 
short of absolute completeness. But such a rule would itself be a ‘default rule’: 
it would be a legal rule defining the obligations (or lack of obligations) that re-
sult when a contract does not itself specify what rules should govern. As long as 
actual contracts fall short of full completeness, then, the existence of default 
rules is not so much a choice as a logical necessity. 
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 The second claim is that the overall effects of multiple variables 
cannot be summed.120 In the Hadley context, even if lawmakers can 
estimate buyer valuation distributions with confidence, they would 
still need to estimate all of the other variables for the same popula-
tion and aggregate the impact. How significant are the transaction 
costs? What are the efficiency gains from more tailored precautions? 
And what are the interactions between each of these variables? The 
optimal default rule could only be selected upon completion of this 
arduous analytic work.121 
 In fact, there may be further concerns. Suppose lawmakers can 
measure, with some confidence, all relevant variables in a single ex-
periment, thus solving the “vague variable” and “summing-up” prob-
lems. And imagine that they do this over several different markets. 
It is entirely possible that the optimal default rule in one market is 
empirically different than the optimal rule in another. Maybe the 
valuation distribution curves of home construction, for example, 
skew negatively, indicating a preference for a full-damages default, 
while valuations of delivery contracts skew positively, advocating a 
Hadley rule. In this case, should lawmakers prefer customized de-
fault rules—where each market gets its optimal default—or, in the 
interests of contracting certainty, should they select just one global 
default for the issue of consequential damages?122 A parallel problem 
exists for heterogeneous contractors within a single market.123 
Should lawmakers use Hadley for one set of home builders and full 
damages for another? These choices raise fundamental jurispruden-
tial issues of rules versus standards that permeate many areas of the 
law.124 
 At its heart, though, Posner’s challenge to economic contracts 
scholarship highlights a need for empiricism. If key variables are 
truly immeasurable, then the economic approach to contract default 
rules may be futile. But if there are ways to get at the variables—or 
at least at some of the variables—empirically, then economic models 
may offer a tangible foundation for reforming contract law. Posner 
                                                                                                                    
Craswell, supra note 33, at 2. 
 120. Posner, supra note 11, at 838, 880. 
 121. Id. at 836-37. 
 122. This tension is raised in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 125-27. 
 123. Id.; see also Craswell, supra note 33, at 4-5. 
 124. For greater discussion of rules versus standards in the contracts context, see 
Craswell, supra note 14, at 908-09; and Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and 
Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004). On the rules versus 
standards issue more generally, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administra-
tive Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); and Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
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acknowledges that empirical analysis could conceivably spark a “ren-
aissance” in the economic study of contract doctrine: 
[Economic] models enjoy some intellectual advantages . . . for they 
would enable us to make complex and interesting predictions 
about contract law if we had sufficient information about empirical 
conditions. But because we do not have such information, and it 
is—in my view, though others might disagree—unlikely that we 
ever would, the complex economic theories do not get us much 
closer to an understanding of contract law . . . .125 
 And so far, empirical scholarship in contract law is indeed rare. A 
recent review of contracts scholarship in over 500 law journals from 
1985 to 2000 yields just twenty-seven empirical articles, a surpris-
ingly small body of work.126 In actuality, economists—largely outside 
the legal academy—have compiled a substantial body of empirical 
work on contracts, examining the contract terms selected in specific 
markets or situations.127 But this work rarely considers explicit doc-
trinal implications for contract law.128 Said differently, the models of 
contract default rules developed by legal scholars have been sub-
jected to little empirical testing. This is true even though scholars of-
ten call for empirical study.129 
 An empirical analysis of Hadley, then, might take on a greater 
significance. If key variables can be measured empirically, a growing 
body of scholarship could test and refine economic models of contract 
                                                                                                                    
 125. Posner, supra note 11, at 864-65. 
 126. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036-37. Korobkin explains his results as follows: 
Despite the fact that . . . contract law is a relatively rich area for legal scholar-
ship, I was able to identify fewer than thirty articles relevant to this review, 
and many of these either only arguably meet the definition of “empirical” or 
provide a tenuous link between the data gathered and any contract doctrine. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Also see supra note 20 for other sources of evidence that nonempiri-
cal approaches to contract doctrine are much more prevalent. 
 127. See, e.g., Douglas Allen & Dean Lueck, Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: 
Cash Rent Versus Cropshare, 35 J.L. & ECON. 397 (1992); Victor P. Goldberg & John R. 
Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petro-
leum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987). For a survey of this work, see Pierre-Andre Chiap-
pori & Bernard Salanié, Testing Contract Theory: A Recent Survey of Some Work, in 1 
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 115 (Mathias 
Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003). While this literature dates back to the 1980s, much of the 
work has occurred in the past five years. Id. at 142. And even here, “the empirical valida-
tion of the theory has long lagged behind the theoretical work.” Id. at 115. 
 128. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036 (“[A]lthough there is a very large body of 
empirical studies of contracting, there is extremely little empirical contract law scholarship 
being produced in the legal academy today.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 900 
(2003) (“I join [Eric] Posner in welcoming and predicting a shift from the theoretical to the 
empirical.”); Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1061 (“[T]he surprising dearth of empirical re-
search in contract law scholarship . . . presents a sizeable opportunity for scholars to help 
to define an emerging field.”); Schwartz & Watson, supra note 62, at 23 (“That so little data 
exist relating contract costs to contract form implies the need for serious empirical re-
search.”). 
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law. The next Part turns to this possibility through a case study as-
sessing the Hadley rule. 
III.   AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY OF HADLEY V. BAXENDALE 
 This Part launches an empirical case study of the Hadley rule. 
Part III.A describes the model used for the test.130 Part III.B presents 
data from several marketing studies and uses this data to empiri-
cally estimate buyer valuation distributions in three simple markets. 
Part III.C runs Monte Carlo simulations to incorporate the effects of 
multiple variables. These simulations indicate that a Hadley default 
typically generates more welfare than a full-damages default in each 
market studied. Finally, Part III.D qualifies these findings by con-
ducting sensitivity analysis on other variables in the model. 
A.   Developing a Working Model of Hadley 
 Under the empirical model of Hadley, one hundred buyers must 
first decide whether to contract with a seller. Each buyer has a dif-
ferent valuation of contract performance (VALUE) chosen randomly 
from a predetermined probability distribution.131 This valuation is 
split between general damages (GD) and consequential damages 
(CD). Specifically, the first portion of damages is deemed general—up 
to a constant assumption for GD—and the balance of VALUE is 
CD.132 General damages always occur with breach, but buyers may 
not incur consequential damages.133 The probability of suffering con-
sequential damages (PROBCD) is determined randomly for each 
buyer, again from a known distribution of values.134 
 The seller may take low, medium, or high precautions for each 
buyer. Greater levels of precautions increase the probability of suc-
cessful contract performance (PROBLOW, PROBMED, PROBHIGH) 
but also cost more (COSTLOW, COSTMED, COSTHIGH). Without 
                                                                                                                    
 130. The model is also available, upon request, from the author, at ggeis@law.ua.edu. 
The model is built in Microsoft Excel, and users will also need to download and install 
Crystal Ball, an Excel add-in simulation program available from Decisioneering at 
http://crystalball.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). 
 131. The shape and parameters of the probability distribution differ for each market 
and are derived empirically. See infra Part III.B. 
 132. If the random VALUE for any buyer is less than the constant assumption for GD, 
then all damages are considered general. For example, if general damages are assumed to 
be $0.20 and buyer number 26 values contract performance at just $0.15, then all of that 
buyer’s damages are deemed general (GD = $0.15), and no damages are consequential (CD 
= $0.00). 
 133. Cf. Adler, supra note 7, at 1560 (modeling consequential damages stochastically). 
 134. Initial values are selected from a normal probability distribution with a mean of 
90%, a standard deviation of 5%, a minimum value of 0%, and a maximum value of 100% 
(the tails of the normal distribution below 0% and above 100% are distributed proportion-
ately along the rest of the curve). Changes to this distribution are discussed infra Part 
III.D.1. 
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knowing a buyer’s specific valuation, the seller will take precautions 
reflecting the average buyer’s preference.135 
 Most buyers sort into low-, medium-, or high-value buyers based 
on their preferred level of precautions. This is determined by calcu-
lating the expected utility for each buyer under the three precaution 
levels according to the following formula (where x is low, medium, or 
high): 
Utilityx = ((1 – PROBCD) * (GD * PROBx – COSTx)) + (PROBCD * 
((GD + CD) * PROBx – COSTx)) 
Buyers with very low valuations may refuse to contract because they 
derive no utility under any level of precautions. These null buyers 
are excluded from further analysis.  
FIGURE 2 
BUYER DECISION FLOWCHART 
 
 All other buyers must then decide whether to inform sellers of 
their valuation type. As Figure 2 illustrates, they make this decision 
based on four factors: (1) the legal default rule (Hadley or full dam-
ages), (2) the net benefits of moving to tailored precautions (Ulow, 
Umed, or Uhigh), (3) the transaction costs required to contract 
around the default (TCLOW or TCHIGH), and (4) the cost or benefit 
of revealing their probability of suffering consequential damages. 
This last factor relates to the additional information costs modeled by 
Adler and is, thus, labeled IC in Figure 2.136 If PROBCD for a buyer 
                                                                                                                    
 135. Thus it is also assumed that sellers know the overall probability function for 
buyer valuations but not the actual valuation for any given buyer. See Bebchuk & Shavell, 
supra note 5, at 285. Similarly, there is no other way for buyers to signal their type to sell-
ers. See id.; cf. id. at 285 (modeling the Hadley problem in this manner). 
 136. Adler, supra note 7, at 1565-66.  
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exceeds the average probability of incurring consequential damages, 
then he will be charged a higher price. Conversely, if PROBCD is be-
low average, the buyer will enjoy another benefit from revealing his 
type.137 
 More specifically, high-value buyers will reveal their type under a 
Hadley default rule when the benefits of moving from medium to 
high precautions outweigh the transaction costs and information 
costs of doing so.138 Low-value buyers will reveal their type under a 
full-damages default rule when the benefits of moving from medium 
to low precautions outweigh the costs.139 Since medium-value buyers 
prefer medium precautions, they have no incentive to reveal their 
type under either default rule. 
FIGURE 3 
SELLER DECISION FLOWCHART 
 
 
 The seller must then choose how to treat each buyer, as Figure 3 
illustrates. For the purposes of this model, buyers refusing to con-
tract will be ignored in further analysis and buyers revealing their 
type will be given their requested level of precautions. But how 
should the seller treat silent buyers? There are two options. If few 
other contracting buyers have revealed their type, then the seller 
may continue to take average precautions for all silent buyers. Alter-
natively, if many other buyers reveal their type, the seller may de-
duce that silent buyers want more tailored precautions (that is, low 
                                                                                                                    
 137. Id. This assumes there are no reliability concerns with the buyer’s information 
revelation. 
 138. Utilityhigh – Utilitymed > TCHIGH + IC 
 139. Utilitylow – Utilitymed > TCLOW + IC 
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precautions in a Hadley regime or high precautions in a full-damages 
regime). 
 Separation variables (SEPHIGH and SEPLOW) are used to model 
this seller decision regarding precaution levels. If the proportion of 
contracting buyers140 who reveal their type exceeds the variable, then 
sellers will take tailored precautions for everyone (including medium 
buyers) and a separating equilibrium results.141 Conversely, if the 
number of revealing buyers falls short of the separation variable, a 
pooling equilibrium results and all silent buyers receive medium pre-
cautions. 
FIGURE 4 
SOCIAL WELFARE FLOWCHART: FULL-DAMAGES DEFAULT 
 
 
 After all decisions take place, the model calculates total social wel-
fare under both default rules for the given set of 100 buyers. Null 
buyers generate no welfare. Under a full-damages default, as illus-
trated in Figure 4, high- and medium-value buyers contribute utility-
high under a separation equilibrium and utilitymedium under a pooling 
one. Low-value buyers revealing their type contribute utilitylow mi-
                                                                                                                    
 140. Buyers refusing to contract at all (null buyers) are ignored in this calculation. 
 141. For example, as initially modeled, under a Hadley default at least 20% of all con-
tracting buyers need to identify themselves as high-value buyers before the nonidentifying 
buyers (low-value buyers, medium-value buyers, and high-value buyers refusing to identify 
their type) receive low precautions. If less than 20% of high-value buyers reveal their type, 
then nonidentifying buyers receive medium precautions. Of course, buyers choosing to 
identify their type will continue to receive their bargained-for level of precautions. As will 
become apparent through sensitivity analysis, this is an important variable. See infra Part 
III.D.4. 
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nus the transaction costs incurred.142 Low-value buyers remaining si-
lent are treated like high- and medium-value buyers. 
 The social welfare calculations are similar under a Hadley default, 
as Figure 5 illustrates. Low- and medium-value buyers contribute 
utilitylow if the buyer population separates and utilitymedium if it does 
not. If they remain silent, high-value buyers contribute the same 
utility as low- and medium-value buyers. If they reveal their type, 
they contribute utilityhigh minus transaction costs. 
FIGURE 5 
SOCIAL WELFARE FLOWCHART: HADLEY DEFAULT 
 
 
 Finally, once both sets of calculations are made, the total social 
welfare under each default rule can be compared to determine the 
more efficient default. An easy way to summarize the results is to 
calculate the net benefit of a Hadley default by subtracting the total 
social welfare under a full-damages regime from the total social wel-
fare under a Hadley regime. A positive number means that Hadley 
outperforms full-damages. A negative number means that full-
damages is a better approach. 
 But the real power of simulation modeling comes from the ability 
to play out the efficiency effects of both default rules hundreds or 
thousands of times. In each trial, a different set of 100 buyers is 
generated, and the net benefit (or cost) of a Hadley default is recal-
culated. Taken together, this analysis leads to a much greater un-
                                                                                                                    
 142. Information costs are excluded from the utility calculation because they are 
merely transferred from buyer to seller. In other words, these costs play into the buyer’s 
decision but are not a deadweight loss for social welfare. 
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derstanding of the better default rule for a given market, along with 
the likely range of outcomes. Before running the simulations, how-
ever, the distribution of buyer valuations must be derived empiri-
cally for the three markets to be studied. 
B.   Estimating the Distribution of Buyer Valuations Empirically 
1.   Data and Methodology 
 Across the quadrangles of most universities, scholars in the field 
of marketing have long been interested in estimates of buyer valua-
tion, although they call this variable by another name: willingness to 
pay (WTP).143 Marketing researchers need WTP data to estimate 
product demand and to set prices.144 WTP also becomes the yardstick 
by which new products (or modifications to existing products) must 
be measured. Over the years, marketing researchers have developed 
several techniques for estimating buyer WTP, which they use to con-
duct vast numbers of empirical studies.145 
                                                                                                                    
 143. See, e.g., SATTLER & VÖLCKNER, supra note 22, at 2 passim (analyzing “four methods 
of measuring willingness-to-pay”); Smith & Nagle, supra note 22 (explaining why pricing 
strategy should include estimation of buyer value in addition to willingness to pay); Werten-
broch & Skiera, supra note 22 (examining various methods for determining buyer willingness 
to pay). 
 144. The typical use of marketing research in this context is not just for setting 
spot prices but, more broadly, for seeking an actionable consumer segmentation that 
allows sellers to capture consumer surplus through more sophisticated price discrimi-
nation. This requires sellers to estimate the distribution of buyer valuations, translate 
this data into a demand curve, identify a given customer’s position on the demand 
curve, and price accordingly. See, e.g., KENT B. MONROE, PRICING: MAKING 
PROFITABLE DECISIONS 26-54 (3d ed. 2003); David Besanko et al., Competitive Price 
Discrimination Strategies in a Vertical Channel Using Aggregate Retail Data, 49 
MGMT. SCI. 1121 (2003); Andrea Shepard, Price Discrimination and Retail Configura-
tion, 99 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1991). On the use of WTP methods to determine demand for 
private goods, see, for example, Diane Bruce Anstine, How Much Will Consumers Pay? 
A Hedonic Analysis of the Cable Television Industry, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 129 (2001); 
Philip M. Clarke, Valuing the Benefits of Mobile Mammographic Screening Units Us-
ing the Contingent Valuation Method, 32 APPLIED ECON. 1647 (2000); and George 
Dranitsaris et al., The Economic Value of a New Insulin Preparation, Humalog® Mix 
25™: Measured by a Willingness-to-Pay Approach, 18 PHARMACOECONOMICS 275 
(2000). On the use of WTP methods—especially contingent valuation—to determine 
the demand for public goods, see, for example, Catherine M. Chambers & John C. 
Whitehead, A Contingent Valuation Estimate of the Benefits of Wolves in Minnesota, 
26 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 249 (2003); Adam Finn et al., Valuing the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 27 J. CULTURAL ECON. 177 (2003); and Dale Whittington et 
al., Estimating the Willingness to Pay for Water Services in Developing Countries: A 
Case Study of the Use of Contingent Valuation Surveys in Southern Haiti, 38 ECON. 
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 293 (1990). 
 145. These techniques include actual transactions studies, contingent valuation, 
incentive-compatible auctions, and lottery procedures, such as the Becker, DeGroot, 
and Marschak (BDM) procedure. In historical data studies, researchers gather scan-
ner data or other historical sales data to view buyer reactions at different price points. 
See, e.g., Alvin J. Silk & Glen L. Urban, Pre-Test-Market Evaluation of New Packaged 
Goods: A Model and Measurement Methodology, 15 J. MARKETING RES. 171 (1978) 
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 In 2002, Klaus Wertenbroch and Bernd Skiera published a series 
of experiments in the Journal of Marketing Research where they es-
timated a population’s WTP for three simple consumer products: a 
can of Coca-Cola, a piece of pound cake, and a type of ergonomic 
pen.146 The technique used in these studies is called the Becker, 
DeGroot, and Marschak (BDM) procedure,147 which the authors find 
more reliable than other WTP measurement techniques.148 Werten-
broch and Skiera have agreed to share the data from these studies 
for use in this Article. 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
(discussing the use of the ASSESSOR model to estimate sales potential of new prod-
ucts). Contingent valuation measures buyer WTP via stated preferences, looking to 
behavioral intentions and responses to hypothetical choices. See, e.g., ROBERT 
CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: 
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2 (1989); Richard T. Carson, Contingent Valua-
tion: A User’s Guide, 34 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1413 (2000). Incentive-compatible auc-
tions are designed to give all bidders the incentive to reveal their true WTP. Werten-
broch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 228-29. One example is a Vickrey auction, which al-
locates products to the highest bidder at the price offered by the second-highest bid-
der. See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Ten-
ders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 20-23 (1961). Finally, the BDM procedure uses a random-number 
lottery process to determine a consumer’s willingness to pay. See Gordon M. Becker, 
Morris H. DeGroot & Jacob Marschak, Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Se-
quential Method, 9 BEHAV. SCI. 226, 228-30 (1964). Although other researchers char-
acterize the BDM lottery procedure as a type of incentive-compatible technique, see 
Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, it is worth distinguishing between the two be-
cause BDM is not an auction as traditionally understood. While both techniques are 
incentive compatible in that they give buyers every incentive to reveal true WTP, 
BDM can be conducted with just one buyer, at the point of purchase, and does not in-
volve multiparty bidding. 
 146. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-37. 
 147. See Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, supra note 145 (setting forth the BDM proce-
dure). The description of the BDM procedure in this Article is adapted from the studies 
conducted by Wertenbroch and Skiera. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230-32, 
235. 
 148. The studies find that the BDM procedure outperforms contingent valuation on 
measures of face, internal, and criterion validity. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 
22, at 232-34. Face validity was determined by correlating final offer prices with a 
number of other questions, such as “How thirsty/hungry are you right now?” and “How 
much do you like Coca-Cola/cake?” Id. at 232 tbl.2. Internal validity was determined 
using logit analysis of purchase probabilities to estimate demand and by correlations 
between observed and expected demand. Id. at 233; see also David Flath & E.W. Leo-
nard, A Comparison of Two Logit Models in the Analysis of Qualitative Marketing 
Data, 16 J. MARKETING RES. 533, 534-36 (1979) (describing a logit model as a binary 
model using logistic distribution). Criterion validity was determined by the “percent-
age of consumers that followed through with their purchase obligation” and other 
post-transaction questions, such as how satisfied the consumer was with his purchase 
and whether he wished that he had bid higher. Id. at 233-34. 
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FIGURE 6 
OVERVIEW OF THE BECKER, DEGROOT, AND MARSCHAK PROCEDURE 
 
 
 Figure 6 provides an overview of how the BDM procedure works.149 A 
participant is presented with an opportunity to purchase a product at a 
price no greater than what she is willing to pay. The seller describes the 
product and gives instructions, and the participant makes an offer. The 
seller may give the participant a chance to revise the offer after empha-
sizing that the participant has every incentive to bid her true WTP. Af-
ter the participant makes the final offer (O), the buying price (P) is ran-
domly chosen—perhaps the participant draws P from an urn or a com-
puter generates P—from a prespecified distribution.150 If P is less than 
or equal to O, the participant has a buying obligation at price P. If P is 
greater than O, she has no buying opportunity.151 
                                                                                                                    
 149. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230 fig.1.  
 150. The random numbers in the urn or computer model are typically taken from a 
reasonable distribution of price increments. For example, experiments selling a can of 
Coca-Cola may use random numbers ranging from $0.25 to $1.50, increasing in $0.05 in-
crements. Cf. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231. To avoid anchoring effects, 
sellers do not disclose this price distribution to participants. For a discussion on the dis-
torting effects of anchoring, see Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the 
Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120, 123-26 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); and 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974). 
 151. For example, if the participant offers $20 and selects a random price of $15 from 
the urn, then she must buy the product for $15. By contrast, if she selects a random price 
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 Conducted under these conditions, the BDM procedure should in-
duce the participant to reveal her true WTP.152 For example, if she 
bids $10 below her WTP and P is randomly selected at $5 below her 
WTP, she loses consumer surplus by missing the buying opportunity. 
If she bids $10 above her WTP and the random number selected is $5 
greater than her WTP, she must purchase at a price greater than her 
valuation. Finally, the ultimate price is determined exogenously from 
the offer, giving her every incentive to reveal true WTP.153 
 The BDM procedure may provide reliable valuation data for several 
other reasons. First, unlike some other WTP estimation techniques, it 
creates opportunities for transactions at real point-of-purchase loca-
tions, allowing for better sample selection conditions.154 Second, the 
procedure imposes a buying obligation on the consumer, removing a 
hypothetical bias that can come with research techniques where a par-
ticipant need not pull out her purse.155 Third, the BDM procedure 
avoids an anchoring bias by never stating a reference price and by 
keeping the random price distribution secret.156 Finally, studies pre-
sent evidence that the BDM procedure is easier to administer and less 
confusing for participants than other WTP research methods.157 
 So far, the BDM method has only been used on consumable prod-
ucts and simple consumer durables, and it is unknown whether the 
domain of applicability will extend to more complex contracting situa-
tions.158 It may be hard, for example, to envision a BDM study that 
tests WTP for oil refinery construction or complex derivatives. In the-
ory, there is no reason why the BDM procedure could not be applied to 
more sophisticated markets, thus providing an empirical basis for es-
                                                                                                                    
of $25 from the urn, then she has no opportunity to buy the product and the exercise is 
concluded. Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, supra note 145, at 228-29; Wertenbroch & 
Skiera, supra note 22, at 230. 
 152. See Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230. 
 153. See John H. Kagel, Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 501 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); 
Vickrey, supra note 145. 
 154. See Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 230. 
 155. Id. at 230-31; see also Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 269, 315-20 (1989) (discussing some of the biases due to the hypothetical na-
ture of contingent valuation); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of Environ-
mental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 
921-29 (1994) (discussing the economic criticisms of contingent valuation biases); Note, “Ask a 
Silly Question . . . ”: Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1981, 1982 (1992) (“CV measurements of nonuse values are so speculative that the costs of 
using CV to assess damages to natural resources almost always outweigh the benefits.”). 
 156. Indeed, it is critical not to disclose the probability distribution of random prices to 
participants to avoid anchoring effects. See Peter Bohm et al., Eliciting Reservation Prices: 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets, 107 ECON. J. 1079, 1088-89 (1997); see 
also sources cited supra note 150. Of course, the participant’s WTP may be influenced by 
existing market price benchmarks, especially for less complicated products. 
 157. Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-32. 
 158. Id. at 234. 
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timating buyer valuation more broadly.159 But, for now, extended ap-
plication of the BDM procedure is untested.160 The data that are avail-
able, however, can be used to estimate buyer valuation distributions in 
simple consumer markets. 
2.   Fitting the Data to a Probability Distribution 
 Table 8 calculates summary statistics for the three markets stud-
ied by Wertenbroch and Skiera, and Figure 7 graphically displays 
the valuation distribution for pens.161 The pen data skews heavily to 
                                                                                                                    
 159. Conducting these experiments might require some additional steps. For example, 
researchers would need to select a meaningful sample, provide detailed product informa-
tion, and establish credit mechanisms to avoid liquidity constraints. Similarly, spot credit 
mechanisms could conceivably open more complex markets to empirical testing. See id. 
 160. There may be other concerns, not necessarily with the BDM method itself, but with the 
use of experimental data more generally. All field-based methods for estimating WTP might be 
subject to strategic misrepresentation by participants. See id. at 234-36. For example, if partici-
pants believe that a study is being used to explore a price increase, then they may falsely under-
report WTP in order to strategically keep prices low. See id. at 234 (noting that a subject’s re-
sponse may not be accurate if his “normative response goals extend beyond the immediate sur-
vey context”). A second form of strategic misrepresentation, the escalation of commitment, re-
lates to behavioral economics. See id. A participant may overstate her WTP because having 
agreed to participate in the study, she does not want to walk away empty-handed. Id. Werten-
broch and Skiera test for this by giving one group of participants a reward for participating in 
the study, regardless of the ultimate purchase outcome. Id. at 234-35. They find that the two 
groups—the reward group and the non-reward group—do not differ statistically in their valua-
tion of the product, arguing against a significant escalation of commitment bias in the BDM 
context. Id. at 235-36. A third strategic problem may occur if a participant bids more than her 
WTP in order to secure an option to buy but walks away without buying if the random price P is 
too high. See id. at 234; see also Jeff T. Casey & Philippe Delquié, Stated vs Implicit Willingness 
to Pay Under Risk, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 123, 134, 136 
(1995) (discussing the effect of a subject’s belief that his payment or loss may never be enforced). 
This is why it is critical that participants in an experiment follow through with buying obliga-
tions. See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Re-
search: A Case Study of New Packaging for Fresh Beef, 12 MARKETING SCI. 318, 328 (1993). 
Studies thus far suggest that this effect is minimal: just 4 out of 81 buyers refused to purchase 
in the Wertenbroch study, Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 234, and just 2 out of 765 
buyers refused to purchase in the Hoffman study, Hoffman et al., supra, at 328. Fourth, some 
studies suggest that just placing extra attention on a product causes participants to systemati-
cally overstate their WTP and that by trying to measure WTP distributions, researchers might 
affect the results. See Ziv Carmon & Itamar Simonson, Price-Quality Trade-Offs in Choice Ver-
sus Matching: New Insights into the Prominence Effect, 7 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 323 (1998); 
Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 234. Finally, broader issues of bounded rationality may 
surface. Compare Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (exploring behavioral inconsistencies between 
WTP and Willingness to Accept (WTA) for identical products), with W. Michael Hanemann, 
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 
635 (1991) (suggesting that differences between WTP and WTA can be consistent with economic 
theory). On the differences between WTP and WTA and the implications of these differences for 
economic analysis of the law, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay 
vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993). 
 161. For the methods, results, and discussion of the studies of these markets, see 
Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 231-37. A convenience sample of university stu-
dents was used for the pen experiment, possibly limiting inferences from this data to a 
greater population. Id. at 235. Random sampling was used in the Coca-Cola and cake ex-
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the right—there are many low-value buyers and just a few high-
value buyers (one generous soul offers $16). 
TABLE 8 











PENS* 165 0.00 16.00 1.38 1.57 5.58 0.19 
COCA-
COLA** 
100 0.00 3.00 1.07 0.65 0.22 0.24 
CAKE** 100 0.00 2.50 1.12 0.56 -0.29 0.24 
  * value in U.S. $ 
** value in DM (DM 1.00 is approximately U.S. $0.55) 
FIGURE 7 
BUYER VALUATION DISTRIBUTION FOR PENS (N = 165) 
 
 
 This sample data provides a basis for estimating the overall dis-
tribution of values in the ergonomic pen market, at least for the 
population covered in the study. Statistical goodness-of-fit tests, such 
                                                                                                                    
periments. Id. at 231. For additional details on the study methodology, see id. at 231-37. 
For details on the face validity, internal validity, and criterion validity of this experiment, 
see id. at 234-35. While the authors divided the 165 pen participants undergoing the BDM 
procedure into two different treatment groups, they reported no statistical difference in the 
WTP of both groups, so the data are combined in this Article. Id. at 235-36. Data from par-
ticipants offering contingent-valuation estimates of their WTP for pens are excluded. 
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as the Chi-Square test, measure how well the data fits a number of 
common probability distributions.162 For the pen data, a lognormal 
distribution offers the tightest fit163 and will be used to select the 





                                                                                                                    
 162. The Chi-Square test breaks down the known distributions into areas of equal 
probability and compares the sample data points within each area to the number of ex-
pected data points. See DEREK ROWNTREE, STATISTICS WITHOUT TEARS: A PRIMER FOR 
NON-MATHEMATICIANS 150-54 (1981). Similarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test essentially 
calculates the largest vertical distance between the two cumulative distributions. On the 
calculation and uses of this test, see Jean Dickinson Gibbons, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Sym-
metry Test, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES 396 (Samuel Kotz et al. eds., 
1982); and M.A. Stephens, Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Type Tests of Fit, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
STATISTICAL SCIENCES, supra, at 398. For an adaptation of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, 
see Donald W.K. Andrews, A Conditional Kolmogorov Test, 65 ECONOMETRICA 1097 (1997). 
The Anderson-Darling test is similar, but it weighs the differences between the two distri-
butions at their tails greater than at their mid-ranges. On the calculation and uses of this 
test, see M.A. Stephens, Anderson-Darling Test of Goodness of Fit, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
STATISTICAL SCIENCES, supra, at 81, 81-85.  









Lognormal* 70.55 0.11 16.23 
Exponential 83.45 0.15 12.10 
Extreme Value 84.18 0.13 1.61 
Logistic 105.09 0.14 3.76 
Weibull 102.73 0.20 8.19 
Beta 103.45 0.022 15.70 
Gamma 113.64 0.18 5.86 
Normal 118.18 0.21 11.62 
Uniform 771.80 0.75 218.47 
* Mean = 1.73; standard deviation = 2.42 
 
The lognormal distribution is commonly used to model situations where values are posi-
tively skewed—such as securities or real estate valuation. The natural logarithm of the 
variable yields a normal distribution. This means that the variable can increase without 
limits but cannot fall below zero. Most of the values are near the lower limit. While the 
lognormal distribution offers the best fit for this data, the goodness-of-fit tests do not have 
a high level of statistical significance. The main point of this example, though, is not to ar-
gue that this specific data fits the lognormal distribution with a high level of confidence 
but rather to ground the distribution of buyer valuations in empirical data. Another ap-
proach is to build a custom probability distribution reflecting the exact experimental re-
sults. The results of this Article hold when this approach is taken. In fact, rerunning the 
analysis with a custom probability distribution substituted for the lognormal distribution 
causes the Hadley default to outperform the full-damages default even more frequently 
than 90%. The qualifications discussed infra Part III.D also hold with a custom probability 
distribution, although the percentage of results where a full-damages default generates 
more welfare changes slightly. 
 164. The specific distribution parameters (mean 1.73; standard deviation 2.42) are cal-
culated with raw data from the Wertenbroch and Skiera study. Wertenbroch & Skiera, su-
pra note 22, at 231-37. 







 The analysis can be replicated for the other markets. Figure 8a 
reveals that the distribution of buyer WTP for a can of Coca-Cola 
looks quite different than the valuation distribution for ergonomic 
pens. Statistical tests confirm that buyer valuation for Coca-Cola 
is better modeled with a logistic probability distribution.165 
                                                                                                                    









Logistic* 47.8 0.10 1.19 
Beta 48.1 0.16 24.32 
Weibull 51.7 0.14 4.25 
Normal 55.5 0.11 1.35 
Gamma 55.0 0.11 1.52 
Triangular 59.4 0.16 7.12 
Lognormal 63.0 0.19 28.45 
Exponential 73.0 0.25 30.18 
Uniform 115.0 0.32 16.43 
* Mean = 1.06; scale = 0.37 
 
A logistic distribution with a mean of 1.06 and a scale of 0.37 will be used in the simula-
tion. The logistic distribution is commonly used to describe growth—for example, the size 
of a population over time. For the purposes of this Article, the logistic distribution is trun-
cated at zero to avoid negative valuations, and the negative tail is reallocated proportion-











DISTRIBUTION FOR COCA-COLA (N = 100) 
FIGURE 8B 
BUYER VALUATION 
DISTRIBUTION FOR CAKE (N = 100) 
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 Finally, the pound cake data are graphed in Figure 8b. The evi-
dence supports a probability distribution similar to the one selected 
for the Coca-Cola data.166  
3.   An Aside: Testing the Majoritarian Solution to Hadley 
 As a brief aside, if the majoritarian solution to Hadley was suffi-
ciently robust, it would be straightforward to use this data to empiri-
cally determine the optimal default rule for any given market. Law-
makers could conduct an experiment to solicit WTP data from a ran-
dom sample of buyers in the market. They would then make infer-
ences about the distribution of valuations for the broader contracting 
population. This might advocate a majoritarian, and thus most effi-
cient, default rule. 
 For example, suppose a lawmaker faces a sample of 100 buyers 
with performance valuations distributed as in Figure 1a.167 The law-
maker could immediately observe that 65% of the buyers in this 
sample have valuations below the mean.168 This suggests that the 
Hadley rule, appropriate with many low-value buyers, looks promis-
ing. Using inferential statistics, the lawmaker might then generalize 
from the sample to the relevant population by testing the following 
hypotheses: 
H0: Buyer valuations for the population are not skewed positively 
(µ3 ≤ 0) 
Ha: Buyer valuations for the population are skewed positively 
(µ3 > 0) 
                                                                                                                    









Logistic* 25.3 0.08 0.84 
Triangular 25.3 0.11 2.43 
Beta 26.2 0.16 13.04 
Normal 35.1 0.11 1.08 
Gamma 34.1 0.13 1.66 
Weibull 34.2 0.13 2.36 
Uniform 50.7 0.21 7.19 
Lognormal 51.4 0.14 15.42 
Exponential 124.9 0.30 22.50 
* Mean = 1.14; scale = 0.32 
 
A logistic distribution with a mean of 1.14 and a scale of 0.32 will be used in the simula-
tion. As with the Coca-Cola distribution, the probability is adjusted slightly to avoid nega-
tive values.  
 167. See supra p. 899 fig.1a. Figure 1a is identical to the table of value distributions 
presented supra note 51. 
 168. Specifically, the first 65 buyers have a valuation less than the mean of 5.1. 
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 The statistic for skewness, µ3, measures the degree of asymmetry 
of a distribution around its mean.169 Positive skewness indicates a 
distribution with a right-sided tail; negative skewness indicates the 
opposite.170 In this example, the lawmaker could reject the null hy-
pothesis at the 99% confidence level: 
µ3 = 1.086 ± (2.58) * (the standard error) 
µ3 = 1.086 ± (2.58) * (0.241) 
µ3 = 0.464 to 1.708 
 Therefore, reject H0 at the 99% confidence level because µ3 does 
not appear to be less than zero. 
 Such an inference supports the Hadley rule as the superior de-
fault. The sample of 100 buyers yields a highly confident inference 
that buyer valuations for the entire population are not skewed to the 
left.171 A lawmaker subscribing to the majoritarian solution should 
reject the full-damages default rule and impose a Hadley default rule 
to lower transaction costs and increase social welfare. 
 This same analysis would advocate the Hadley rule in the market 
for pens. The skewness statistic is so large that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected with great confidence.172 The data for Coca-Cola and 
cake, however, do not conclusively point to a majoritarian default; 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in both cases.173 
 But, as discussed earlier, the majoritarian solution does not fully 
capture the intricacies of contracting under asymmetric informa-
tion.174 The next task is to combine information on buyer valuation 
distributions with other variables in the Hadley model. 
                                                                                                                    
 169. More specifically, skewness is based on the relationship between the mean and 
the mode: greater distances between the mean and mode lead to a higher value for the 
skewness statistic. ROWNTREE, supra note 162, at 61. 
 170. Id. at 59. 
 171. This is true because the inferred skewness for the population is greater than zero, 
rejecting a left-skewed population at the 99% confidence level. 
 172. Taking the statistics from Table 8, supra p. 931: 
   µ3 = 5.58 ± (2.58) * (0.19) 
   µ3 = 5.09 to 6.07 
Therefore, reject H0 at the 99% confidence level. 
 173. Again, using the statistics calculated in Table 8, supra p. 931. For Coca-Cola: 
   µ3 = 0.22 ± (2.58) * (0.24) 
   µ3 = -0.40 to 0.84 
Therefore, do not reject H0 at the 99% confidence level. 
For cake: 
   µ3 = -0.29 ± (2.58) * (0.24) 
   µ3 = -0.91 to 0.33 
Therefore, do not reject H0 at the 99% confidence level. 
 174. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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C.   Selecting the Better Default Rule 
 In the 1940s, Stanislaw Ulam, a Polish mathematician working 
with John von Neumann on the Manhattan Project, wanted to esti-
mate his chances of winning a game of fifty-two card solitaire.175 To 
solve the problem, he programmed a computer to play out the card 
game continually and track the results.176 Ulam’s musings at Los 
Alamos led to the modern analytical technique of Monte Carlo simu-
lation, which uses statistical computer sampling to approximate so-
lutions to quantitative problems.177 Random values are repeatedly 
generated to model the impact of uncertain variables on a range of 
outcomes. Monte Carlo simulation, deriving its name from similari-
ties to the games of chance played in Monaco, has been used exten-
sively to model decisionmaking under uncertainty in physics, engi-
neering, business, and mathematics.178 There is also precedent for 
running Monte Carlo techniques in legal scholarship.179 
 Using Monte Carlo simulation, this Part finds that a Hadley de-
fault rule typically outperforms a full-damages default rule in three 
simple markets. The distribution of buyer valuations for each market 
is grounded in empirical research from the Wertenbroch and Skiera 
studies.180 But to conduct the simulation, assumptions must be made 
for other variables in the Hadley model.181 
 Table 9 displays a list of initial assumptions, chosen to reflect a 
reasonable contracting system (each assumption is relaxed later to 
conduct sensitivity analysis).182 Note that three variables—the prob-
ability of incurring consequential damages, transaction costs, and the 
separation threshold—do not differ initially between low- and high-
value buyers. The impact of different assumptions by buyer type for 
these variables is considered shortly.183 
                                                                                                                    
 175. See Eckhardt, supra note 23, at 131-36. 
 176. Id.; Nicholas Metropolis, The Beginning of the Monte Carlo Method, 15 LOS 
ALAMOS SCI. 125 (1987). 
 177. See Eckhardt, supra note 23, at 131; see also RUSSELL DAVIDSON & JAMES G. 
MACKINNON, ECONOMETRIC THEORY AND METHODS 157 (2004); GENTLE, supra note 23; 
JÄCKEL, supra note 23; MANNO, supra note 23. 
 178. MANNO, supra note 23, at 9. 
 179. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 229-31 (2002) (using Monte Carlo simulation to test a 
campaign finance secrecy algorithm); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial 
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 660 
(1999). On the related concept of using agent-based computer simulation to inform legal 
doctrine, see Randal C. Picker, Simlaw 2011, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019. 
 180. See supra Part III.B. 
 181. Additional experiments that simultaneously estimate these other variables might 
yield more robust results. See infra Part IV. 
 182. For example, the precaution variables are chosen such that low precautions cost 
less and are less effective than medium precautions, so the average-value buyer prefers 
medium precautions. 
 183. See infra Part III.D. 
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TABLE 9 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS IN THE HADLEY SIMULATION MODEL 
VARIABLE ASSUMPTION 
1. Buyer valuation (VALUE) Market specific 
2. General damages (GD) $0.20184 
3. Probability of consequential damages (PROBCD) N (90%, 5%)185 
4. Success with low precautions (PROBLOW) 50% 
5. Cost of low precautions (COSTLOW) $0.20 
6. Success with medium precautions (PROBMED) 70% 
7. Cost of medium precautions (COSTMED) $0.40 
8. Success with high precautions (PROBHIGH) 90% 
9. Cost of high precautions (COSTHIGH) $0.75 
10. Transaction costs for low-value buyers (TCLOW) $.05 
11. Transaction costs for high-value buyers (TCHIGH) $.05 
12. Separation threshold for low-value buyers (SEPLOW) 20% 
13. Separation threshold for high-value buyers (SEPHIGH) 20% 
 With these assumptions, the welfare benefits of a Hadley default 
versus a full-damages default can be played out many times. Each 
trial generates a new set of performance valuations for the 100 buy-
ers. The model then determines how many low-value buyers reveal 
their type under a full-damages default and how many high-value 
buyers reveal their type under a Hadley default. If enough buyers re-
veal their type, the population separates and nonidentifying buyers 
receive tailored precautions under the default rule. Ultimately, the 
model calculates total social welfare under both default rules—
according to the algorithms of Figures 4 and 5186—and compares the 
results. 
1.   Pens 
 For example, a single iteration for the pen market might yield the 
outcome shown in Table 10. In this instance, the most generous 
buyer values the pen at $9.76 and the minimum buyer values the 
pen at $0.08. The total social welfare under each default rule is quite 
close, but the Hadley default does slightly better. 
                                                                                                                    
 184. All damages are assumed to be general damages if a buyer’s total valuation is less 
than $0.20. 
 185. This variable is randomly selected from a normal distribution with a mean of 90% 
and a standard deviation of 5%. 
 186. See supra p. 924 fig.4; p. 925 fig.5.  
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TABLE 10 
RESULTS OF ONE ITERATION OF THE HADLEY SIMULATION MODEL 
(PENS) 
 RESULT 
1. Total number of buyers 100 
2. Buyers choosing to contract 82 
3. Number of low-value buyers 36 
4. Number of medium-value buyers 22 
5. Number of high-value buyers 24 
6. Lowest buyer $0.08 
7. Highest buyer $9.76 
8. Buyers identifying their type under full damages 23% 
9. Buyers identifying their type under Hadley 24% 
10. Social welfare under full damages 68.5 
11. Social welfare under Hadley 70.8 
12. Net benefit from Hadley default rule 2.3 
Better default rule Hadley 
  
 Of course, the results of one trial are not very meaningful. After 
saving this data, the simulation next generates a different sample of 
100 random buyer valuations and reevaluates the superior default 
rule. The process is repeated hundreds or thousands of times to ar-
rive at a range of outcomes indicating the likely efficiency benefits of 
one default rule over another. Monte Carlo simulation thus allows 
lawmakers to live in a thousand or more parallel universes, where 
they can compare the effects of both default rules.187 
 A run of 10,000 trials for the pen market—under the assumptions 
of Table 9188—generates the results displayed in Figure 9, infra. This 
figure graphs the net efficiency benefit of a Hadley default rule, and 
a social welfare number greater than zero indicates that Hadley out-
performs a full-damages default. In this simulation, almost 90% of 
the results are positive, suggesting that the Hadley rule leads to a 
more efficient outcome much of the time. The expected value, or av-
erage overall efficiency benefit of the Hadley rule, is 4.8. 
 The distribution of the results is also important. The minimum 
result is negative 3.2, the maximum is 29.7, and the positive area 
under the curve exceeds the negative area. In other words, the up-
side from choosing a Hadley default far outweighs the potential 
downside. Note two clusters of data. There is a break point around 
3.5—about half of the trials are less than this value, while the other 
half exceed it. The lower set of results occurs when the full-damages 
default leads to a separating equilibrium. Hadley often does slightly 
                                                                                                                    
 187. See GENTLE, supra note 23; JÄCKEL, supra note 23; MANNO, supra note 23. 
 188. See supra p. 937 tbl.9.  
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better in these cases, but the range of outcomes is tight, and the de-
fault rule may not matter much. 
FIGURE 9 
NET BENEFIT OF HADLEY RULE OVER FULL-DAMAGES RULE—PENS  
(N = 10,000 TRIALS) 
 
 
 When the full-damages default leads to a pooling equilibrium, how-
ever, the benefits from choosing the Hadley rule can be quite large. Ex-
tremely high-value buyers, who get greater social welfare with high pre-
cautions, drive much of this difference. They receive medium precau-
tions under a pooling full-damages equilibrium. But if the Hadley rule 
causes separation, these high-value buyers get high precautions. And 
even when Hadley pools, the highest-value buyers often contract around 
the default individually. This follows classic penalty-default theory,189 
and the level of precautions received by extreme-value buyers in the pen 
market has a major impact on the relative efficiency of the two defaults. 
 The analysis is quite complicated, though, and Hadley causes at 
least three other effects. First, there is another group of high-value 
buyers who end up with less efficient contracts under Hadley. These 
buyers derive almost as much utility under medium precautions, and 
they choose not to incur the transaction costs (and sometimes the in-
formation costs) of contracting around a Hadley default. But when 
the buyer pool separates, these buyers end up being mistaken for 
low-value buyers and they receive inefficiently low precautions. Sec-
ond, medium-value buyers can also do worse with this default. They 
                                                                                                                    
 189. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 91, 108-18; Craswell, supra note 33, at 5-10. 
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receive low precautions under Hadley instead of the medium precau-
tions that they prefer, and get, with a full-damages pooling equilib-
rium. Finally, most low-value buyers come out better under a Hadley 
separating equilibrium: they receive their preferred precautions 
without needing to incur transaction costs. The Hadley rule can thus 
cause many different effects, some of which may be unintentional. 
2.   Coca-Cola and Cake 
 Figures 10 and 11, infra, present the Monte Carlo simulation re-
sults in the markets for Coca-Cola and pound cake. The default rules 
in these two markets behave similarly, and both markets can be ana-
lyzed together. Hadley still generates more welfare than full dam-
ages—89% of the time with Coca-Cola and 83% of the time with cake. 
The expected value in both markets remains positive, but there are 
different reasons for Hadley’s superiority in these two markets. 
FIGURE 10 
NET BENEFIT OF HADLEY RULE OVER FULL-DAMAGES RULE—COKE  
(N = 10,000 TRIALS) 
 
 
 The most important difference is that there are fewer high-value 
buyers. This means that the Hadley rule almost never leads to a 
separating equilibrium because there are not enough high-value 
buyers to signal their type. It also means that, unlike the pen study, 
extremely high-value buyers are very rare and do not have much im-
pact on the choice of default rule. 
 As before, the results divide into two clusters. In the Coca-Cola 
market, for example, about 40% of the trials result in a net Hadley 
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benefit under 2.0; the other 60% exceeds 2.0. The lower set of values 
occurs when both default rules cause a pooling equilibrium. The choice 
of default rule here is a close call, based on many small effects. The 
Hadley rule generally does better, but not by much. 
 By contrast, Hadley outperforms full damages by a significant mar-
gin in the second data cluster. These results occur when the full-
damages default leads to separation, while buyers in the Hadley de-
fault continue to pool. This is a counterintuitive result: How could a 
Hadley rule leading to pooling—and thus fewer tailored precautions—
outperform a full-damages rule leading to separation?190 
 The explanation is subtle. There is a group of low-value buyers who 
gain almost as much utility contracting under medium precautions as 
they do from contracting under low precautions. With a full-damages 
default, the benefit to these buyers of moving to low precautions does 
not exceed the transaction costs and they do not reveal their type. How-
ever, there is another group that contains enough low-value buyers who 
benefit from low precautions (or from information disclosure benefits) 
that under a full-damages default, the buyer pool separates. This means 
that under a full-damages default, the first group of low-value buyers 
now receives high precautions, which are much less efficient. Under the 
Hadley default, these low-value buyers continue to receive medium pre-
cautions, which results in a net gain to social welfare. 
FIGURE 11 
NET BENEFIT OF HADLEY RULE OVER FULL-DAMAGES RULE—CAKE  
(N = 10,000 TRIALS) 
 
                                                                                                                    
 190. Contra Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 108-18. 
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 More generally, if transaction costs prevent some low-value buy-
ers from revealing their type, but the buyer pool still separates under 
a full-damages default, there is a social welfare loss as these low-
value buyers receive excess precautions. The seller mistakenly con-
cludes that they are high-value types. 
 In these simulations, then, the Hadley default rule outperforms a 
full-damages default nearly 90% of the time in all three markets. 
This happens largely for two different reasons. In the market for 
pens, extreme-value buyers do not always receive high precautions 
with a full-damages default, but they will contract for these efficient 
precautions with Hadley. This is an empirical example of the classic 
penalty-default theory.191 In the markets for Coca-Cola and cake, the 
Hadley default does better, not because of the effects of extreme-
value buyers (there are fewer of these), but rather because low-value 
buyers who do not contract around a full-damages default rule some-
times receive inefficiently high precautions by mistake. 
D.   Qualifying the Findings 
 The analysis thus far might be criticized for relying too heavily on 
assumption-based modeling. While the distribution of buyer valua-
tions is grounded in empirical data, the other variables in the Hadley 
model take on assumptions. This Part uses sensitivity analysis to 
address this concern, and it finds that the merits of the Hadley de-
fault rule must indeed be qualified. In fact, there are lessons to be 
learned through a detailed examination of the various situations 
where Hadley may generate less social welfare. 
 Specifically, in the markets studied, the Hadley rule does not out-
perform a full-damages default in four important circumstances. First, 
Hadley is not preferable when high-value buyers systematically have a 
much greater chance of incurring consequential damages. Second, a 
full-damages default outperforms Hadley when most of the efficiency 
gains from information revelation go to low-value buyers. Third, the 
Hadley rule is often worse when the transaction costs of contracting 
around a default rule are much greater for high-value buyers than for 
low-value buyers. Finally, the analysis assumes perfect competition, 
and introducing seller power into the empirical models might change 
the results. 
 Take the last qualification first. Jason Scott Johnston has devel-
oped a game theoretical model of the Hadley rule, where he relaxes as-
sumptions of perfectly competitive markets.192 In other words, sellers 
                                                                                                                    
 191. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 91, 108-18; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 
5; Craswell, supra note 33, at 5-9. 
 192. See Johnston, supra note 7. 
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are no longer “identical price-taking firms.”193 This introduces several 
new complexities. For instance, sellers now have an incentive to learn 
about buyer valuations, not in order to take efficient precautions, but 
rather to increase their individual profits through price discrimina-
tion.194 It also adds another dimension of information revelation: buy-
ers seek to learn whether different sellers have different probabilities 
of breach.195 Rerunning the empirical analysis with a model that in-
corporates these effects might lead to new conclusions.196 
 The balance of this Part addresses the other qualifications in turn, 
illustrating them with results from the ergonomic pen study.197 It 
also considers the important role played by the separation variable. 
1.   High-Value Buyers Suffer Consequential Damages More  
Frequently 
 Barry Adler’s work on the Hadley doctrine suggests that it may 
not result in an efficient outcome when consequential damages are 
modeled stochastically.198 This Part provides empirical support for 
this finding, while also exploring the boundary conditions necessary 
for Hadley to succeed. Recall that the earlier analysis assumes that a 
buyer’s chance of incurring consequential damages (PROBCD) is 
taken from a normal probability distribution with a mean of 90% and 
a standard deviation of 5%.199 This assumption is used for every 
buyer. 
 The Hadley rule becomes inferior when two changes are made to 
this assumption. First, there must be a very wide difference in the 
probability of incurring consequential damages. This is illustrated 
by changing the parameters of PROBCD to a mean of 70% and a 
standard deviation of 15%, which means that most buyers face a 
probability of incurring consequential damages ranging from 40% to 
100%. Second, the probability of incurring consequential damages 
must be correlated with buyer valuation. In other words, high-value 
buyers are more likely to incur consequential damages than low-
value buyers (a correlation coefficient of 0.8 is used in this analy-
                                                                                                                    
 193. Id. at 625. 
 194. Id. at 625-26. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 626; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 736-37; Schwartz, supra note 
112, at 397-99. This Article, while acknowledging these complications, leaves empirical 
analysis of models with seller market power for another day. It is worth noting, however, 
that even in these models, the distribution of buyer valuations is an important variable 
and insights from empirical simulation models might convey useful information. 
 197. Unless noted otherwise, the qualifications also hold true for the Coca-Cola and 
pound cake data. 
 198. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 199. See supra note 134. 
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sis). With these changes, a full-damages default is usually more ef-
ficient than Hadley, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
FIGURE 12 
HIGH BUYERS FACE GREATER PROBABILITY OF CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES (N = 10,000 TRIALS) 
 
 
 This change is explained largely by high-value buyer behavior. 
Facing much greater information costs, high-value buyers rarely re-
veal their type under a Hadley default. At the same time, low-value 
buyers, with cheaper information costs, separate even more fre-
quently under a full-damages rule. When this happens, high-value 
buyers get efficient high precautions, and the benefits of a full-
damages rule are large.200 If both rules result in a pooling equilib-
rium, Hadley is often slightly better. 
                                                                                                                    
 200. This exception rarely holds in the markets for Coca-Cola and cake. There are 
fewer high-value buyers and the benefits of tailored precautions under a full-damages rule 
is much diminished. Hadley usually remains the superior default rule. 
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TABLE 11 

















SUPERIOR           
(N = 500 TRIALS) 
low deviation, 
no correlation 
70 5 0 92.6 
low deviation, 
high correlation 
70 5 0.8 78.6 
high deviation, 
no correlation 
70 15 0 59 
high deviation, 
high correlation 
70 15 0.8 13.8 
 
 The optimal default rule changes only if both adjustments to 
PROBCD take place. With a tight standard deviation, the informa-
tion cost effects are too small to matter. And if PROBCD and VALUE 
are uncorrelated, then Hadley remains the better default.201 Table 11 
illustrates this point. As Adler’s theoretical model suggests, stochas-
tic consequential damages can affect the optimal default202—but only 
when the probability of incurring damages deviates greatly and is 
tied disproportionately to high-value buyers. 
2.   Low-Value Buyers “Take Most of the Benefits” from Tailored 
Precautions 
 Each seller precaution level might be viewed as a discrete trade-
off along two dimensions: cost and effectiveness (modeled in this case 
as the probability of successfully completing performance). Decreas-
ing the cost or increasing the effectiveness of any one precaution 
level will make it more attractive relative to the other precaution 
choices. But making a precaution level especially attractive does not 
necessarily change the optimal default rule. Very cheap low precau-
tions or very expensive high precautions may still result in an eco-
nomic system where Hadley generates more welfare.203 
 Different precaution assumptions can, however, cause a full-
damages default to become more efficient than Hadley. The key con-
                                                                                                                    
 201. With a wide deviation in PROBCD, the effects are magnified: very low levels of 
correlation between the two variables can cause a full-damages default to outperform Had-
ley. 
 202. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1551-52, 1560-61. 
 203. For example, reducing the cost of low precautions in the pen market from $0.20 to 
$0.05 causes Hadley to still perform better nearly 60% of the time. If the cost of low pre-
cautions continues to be lowered, however, the full-damages default rule will typically be-
come more efficient due to the effects described in this Part. 
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cern is the differentiation between low, high, and medium precau-
tions on the cost-effectiveness spectrum. Specifically, a full-damages 
default can become optimal when low precautions are positioned very 
far away from medium precautions or when high precautions are po-
sitioned very close to medium precautions. In a sense, these changes 
allow low-value buyers to “take most of the benefits” from tailored 
precautions. High-value buyers may as well stick with medium pre-
cautions. 
 In the initial analysis, the cost-effectiveness positions of low, me-
dium, and high precautions are evenly spaced.204 This means that 
high- and low-value buyers each benefit similarly by moving to tai-
lored precautions. Figure 13 portrays four ways to adjust evenly 
spaced precautions. Low precautions become more differentiated (or 
sharper) relative to medium precautions by reducing COSTLOW and 
PROBLOW. Conversely, low precautions become less differentiated 
(or duller) by raising COSTLOW and PROBLOW. High precautions 
follow a similar pattern.  
FIGURE 13 
ADJUSTMENTS TO SELLER PRECAUTIONS 
 
 
 Table 12, infra, shows the results of the Monte Carlo simulation 
with different precaution scenarios. Sharper high precautions or 
duller low precautions cause Hadley to outperform the full-damages 
default almost 100% of the time. But dulling high precautions drops 
the effectiveness of Hadley to 75%. The full-damages default usually 
generates more welfare than Hadley when low precautions are very 
sharp. And it outperforms Hadley over 97% of the time when low 
precautions are sharpened and high precautions are dulled at the 
same time. 
                                                                                                                    
 204. One slight exception: the cost of moving from low to medium precautions ($0.20 
to $0.40) is a bit cheaper than the cost of moving from medium to high precautions 
($0.40 to $0.75), reflecting diminishing marginal returns to the precaution investment. 
See supra p. 937 tbl.9. 
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TABLE 12 









PERCENT OF RESULTS 
WHERE HADLEY IS SU-
PERIOR 
(N = 500 TRIALS) 
0.20 50 0.75 90 90.0 
0.05 35 0.75 90 29.2 
0.30 65 0.75 90 99.8 
0.20 50 0.60 80 75.2 
0.20 50 0.90 95 99.2 
0.05 35 0.60 80 2.8 
 
 Sharpening low precautions causes several effects. First, cheaper 
prices entice null buyers to enter the market, resulting in many more 
low-value buyers. These buyers usually reveal their type, and a sepa-
rating equilibrium typically occurs under a full-damages rule. If 
Hadley pools, these low-value buyers do worse with medium precau-
tions. And Hadley is often less efficient when it leads to a separating 
equilibrium as well. Medium buyers are much worse off with the 
sharper low precautions, which they receive in a Hadley separation, 
than with the high precautions that they receive under a full-
damages default. 
 The analysis is reversed when high precautions are dulled. High-
value buyers have less cause to reveal their type, and the Hadley de-
fault pools more often. Even when Hadley separates, high-value buy-
ers that keep quiet receive inefficient low precautions. These buyers 
are better off under full damages, receiving either medium precau-
tions (with pooling) or high precautions (with separation). 
 Simultaneously sharpening low precautions and dulling high pre-
cautions magnifies both effects. 
3.   High-Value Buyers Incur Much Greater Transaction Costs 
 The optimal default rule can also change when transaction costs 
incurred by high-value buyers are much greater than those incurred 
by low-value buyers. There are two interesting scenarios—either of 
which prevents Hadley from performing better than full damages. 
First, the transaction costs for low-value buyers might be so cheap 
that they can easily contract around inefficient defaults. Second, the 
transaction costs for high-value buyers might be very expensive,205 
hindering them from contracting around inefficient defaults. The two 
                                                                                                                    
 205. This might be true, for instance, if it becomes quite complicated to make special 
arrangements to protect against high levels of consequential damages. 
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scenarios are related and cause similar effects, but they do so 
through different means. 
 For instance, when TCLOW is reduced to $0.01, Hadley outper-
forms the full-damages default rule only 12% of the time, as illus-
trated in Table 13. Because low-value buyer transaction costs are so 
cheap, the full-damages rule always leads to a separating equilib-
rium. Most of the time the Hadley rule also results in separation, but 
high-value buyers with a high probability of incurring consequential 
damages will not reveal their type. Under Hadley, they are treated 
as low-value buyers and get inefficiently low precautions. Under a 
full-damages rule, they are treated as high-value buyers and get effi-
cient precautions.206 
TABLE 13 
TRANSACTION COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
TCLOW  ($) TCHIGH  ($) 
PERCENT OF RESULTS WHERE  
HADLEY IS SUPERIOR             
(N = 500 TRIALS) 
0.05 0.05 91 
0.01 0.05 12 
5.00 0.05 100 
0.05 0.01 100 
0.05 5.00 7 
 
 When TCHIGH is increased to relatively high levels, it becomes 
too expensive for high-value buyers to separate, and the Hadley rule 
results in a pooling equilibrium. When the full-damages rule leads to 
separation, it is the more efficient outcome because high-value buy-
ers receive efficient precautions that they do not get under Hadley. 
Full-damages usually fares better in a pooling equilibrium, as well, 
although very rarely the Hadley rule results in greater total welfare. 
An extremely high-value buyer may benefit so much from high pre-
cautions that he or she incurs the high transaction costs and still 
comes out ahead. As TCHIGH approaches infinity, however, this no 
longer occurs and the full-damages default is always better. 
4.   The Impact of the Separation Variable 
 Recall that the separation variable indicates the minimum num-
ber of buyers required to identify their type before silent buyers re-
ceive tailored precautions.207 For example, if more than 20% of buyers 
                                                                                                                    
 206. Again, this qualification is not necessary in the markets for Coca-Cola and cake 
for the reason described supra note 200. 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.   
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identify their type as high in a Hadley regime, sellers will give all 
other buyers low precautions. This concept receives little discussion 
in the contracts literature because most models assume identical 
valuations for low-value and high-value buyer classes.208 In this 
simulation model, however, valuations vary within each group. This 
means that buyer identification is not an all or nothing affair—the 
model needs to manage an intermediate level of separation. 
 Changing the separation variable by itself has little effect on the 
results in Part III.C. The Hadley rule continues to outperform a full-
damages default even when low-value buyers always separate 
(SEPLOW equals 0%) and high-value buyers always pool (SEPHIGH 
equals 101%).209 But adjusting the separation variable will some-
times mute or magnify the qualifications discussed in this Part. For 
example, doubling the separation variable for low-value buyers to 
40% reinstates Hadley as the superior default rule when high-value 
buyers have a greater probability of incurring consequential dam-
ages.210 The full-damages default now leads to a pooling equilibrium 
most of the time, and high-value buyers no longer receive efficient 
precautions. Similarly, raising SEPLOW mutes the impact of cheap 
transaction costs for low-value buyers.211 
 The way that sellers treat silent buyers, then, might significantly 
affect the optimal consequential-damages default rule. Further re-
search is needed on this topic.212 
IV.   SUMMARY AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
 This case study offers evidence that the Hadley default rule typi-
cally generates more social welfare than a full-damages default rule. 
The work implies that markets with similar conditions might also 
benefit from the Hadley rule. In markets where there are few high-
value buyers—such as the market for pens—Hadley induces these 
                                                                                                                    
 208. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1561-62 & 1561 n.38; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra 
note 5, at 292-303. Adler suggests that modeling buyer valuation stochastically might be a 
fruitful endeavor. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1561 n.38. 
 209. This is generally caused by low-value buyers who refuse to identify their type in a 
full-damages regime and receive inefficiently high precautions. They derive more utility in 
a Hadley regime where they get medium precautions. And recall that extremely high-value 
buyers will still contract around the Hadley default rule for efficiently high precautions, 
even when it results in a pooling equilibrium. 
 210. See supra Part III.D.1. 
 211. For example, rerunning line 2 in Table 13, supra p. 948, (TCLOW = .01; TCHIGH 
= .05) with a higher separation variable for low-value buyers (SEPLOW = 35%) leads to a 
result where Hadley does better in 54% of the trials. 
 212. It would be interesting to test empirically whether sellers choose different separa-
tion variables based on their underlying knowledge of buyer type. For example, if sellers 
realize that only 10% of buyers are high-value types, they might require just 5% to 10% of 
all contracting buyers to reveal their type before other buyers receive tailored precautions. 
The number of medium-value buyers might also play into this calculus. 
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extreme-value buyers to contract for efficiently high precautions. A 
full-damages default for the same buyer population will sometimes 
lead to a pooling equilibrium instead, and the resulting welfare loss 
can be large. In short, this study provides empirical support for the 
classic penalty-default literature.213 
 The Coca-Cola and cake studies suggest that Hadley can also out-
perform a full-damages default in markets where buyer valuations 
are less skewed. This occurs when Hadley leads to a pooling equilib-
rium and the full-damages default causes separation—a counterin-
tuitive result. The explanation is that some buyers have a slight 
preference for low precautions, but not enough to incur the transac-
tion costs of contracting around a full-damages default rule. If 
enough other low-value buyers incur these costs, the population 
separates and the first group of buyers who prefer low precautions 
receives inefficiently high precautions. They are mistaken for high-
value buyers. 
 For both of these reasons, an efficiency-minded lawmaker select-
ing a consequential-damages default rule in markets with similar 
conditions might be justified in choosing the Hadley limitation. While 
Hadley does not always perform better, it is the surer bet. 
 Under several circumstances, however, Hadley is an inferior 
choice. First, if high-value buyers systematically have a much higher 
probability of incurring consequential damages, then they are less 
likely to contract around the default. An additional cost is imposed as 
sellers learn this information. Extreme differences can change the 
optimal default rule. 
 Second, the findings will not hold when low-value buyers take 
most of the benefits from tailored precautions—that is, the cost-
effectiveness trade-off of low precautions is strongly differentiated 
from those of medium and high precautions. The treatment of me-
dium-value buyers, in part, drives this change. Medium-value buyers 
now do worse under a Hadley default because they receive ineffi-
ciently low precautions. 
 Third, if transaction costs for high-value buyers are very expen-
sive, they will not contract around inefficient defaults. Similar re-
sults occur (for different reasons) when transaction costs for low-
value buyers are very cheap. While selecting a consequential-
damages default rule is a tricky task, fraught with competing ef-
fects,214 empirical research can help lawmakers learn more about the 
right conditions for either imposing—or shunning—a Hadley default. 
                                                                                                                    
 213. See sources cited supra notes 5, 7. 
 214. See, e.g., discussion supra note 112; see also Adler, supra note 7; Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note 2; Johnston, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 112. 
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 This case study provides a framework for empirical analysis. But 
the work also raises new questions, and additional research would 
help along multiple fronts. 
 First, more complicated markets need to be examined. The tech-
niques used by marketing scholars to measure buyer willingness to 
pay, such as the BDM procedure, will conceivably extend into more 
complex markets.215 Applying data from these studies might lead to 
tighter-fitting buyer valuation distributions. Work on complex mar-
kets would also move the research closer to the typical domain of 
contract law. 
 Second, it would be powerful to conduct empirical research that 
simultaneously measures multiple variables in the Hadley model. 
This Article grounds buyer valuation in empirical research and mod-
els the other variables with assumptions and sensitivity analysis.216 
Research that extends this work by empirically measuring buyer 
valuations, probability estimates for incurring consequential dam-
ages, cost and effectiveness of seller precautions, and the transaction 
costs needed to choose different precaution levels would yield more 
meaningful results. 
 Third, more work is needed on selecting the optimal level of 
granularity for contract default rules.217 Exploring the classic juris-
prudential rules-versus-standards tension might be helpful in the 
Hadley context.218 Building a greater empirical database on the mer-
its of the Hadley rule versus a full-damages default in other markets 
would be a good start. Lawmakers are unlikely to launch primary 
WTP research to select a default rule for any given dispute, but addi-
tional research might lead to a sharper set of rules—or provide other 
guidance—for courts deciding when to award consequential damages 
in a specific case. 
 Finally, scholars need to launch empirical research that incorpo-
rates seller market power. Moving empirical Hadley analysis to 
game-theoretical models that relax assumptions of perfect competi-
tion will yield more robust insights.219 
V.   USING MARKETING DATA IN CONTRACT LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
 The Hadley case study illustrates the potential benefits of testing 
economic theories of contract law with empirical research. It chal-
                                                                                                                    
 215. See Wertenbroch & Skiera, supra note 22, at 234; see also supra notes 158-60 and 
accompanying text. 
 216. See supra Parts III.C-D.  
 217. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. 
 218. For some of the commentators that have explored this topic, see Diver, supra note 
124; Kaplow, supra note 124; and Katz, supra note 124. 
 219. For some of the studies that have relaxed these assumptions, see Ayres & Gert-
ner, supra note 2, at 746-62; Johnston, supra note 7; and Schwartz, supra note 112. 
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lenges the a priori claim that economic contracts scholarship has 
reached a dead end.220 But, more generally, the study hints that 
marketing research might be a fruitful source of data for contract law 
scholars. This Part briefly explores some possible benefits of connect-
ing the two disciplines. 
 The case for using marketing research in contract law scholarship 
is straightforward. Contract theory, on one hand, needs empirical 
data to test a variety of claims.221 Marketing scholars, on the other 
hand, have conducted vast amounts of empirical research over the 
past several decades.222 In some cases, this research may address the 
same questions being asked in contract law. Both disciplines, after 
all, deal with issues of transactional exchange and consumer prefer-
ences.223 Where there is overlap, contract theory might reap immedi-
ate benefits by drawing upon this marketing work. 
 The potential applications of empirical research span most 
branches of contract law. On the contract formation side, economic 
theory wrestles with offer and acceptance,224 promissory estoppel,225 
unconscionability,226 mistake,227 impossibility,228 and other issues. 
Contract interpretation raises some of the same questions as Hadley, 
specifically: What default rules should be imposed to guide interpre-
tation problems that arise with incomplete or ambiguous con-
                                                                                                                    
 220. For a discussion of this claim, see supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1036-37; Landes, supra note 18, at 170; Wein-
traub, supra note 18, at 4. 
 222. See, e.g., DAVID A. AAKER ET AL., MARKETING RESEARCH (7th ed. 2001); Donald T. 
Campbell & Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research 
on Teaching, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING (N.L. Gage ed., 1963), reprinted in 
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DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING DECISION MAKING: A MODEL 
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 223. Compare Schwartz & Scott, supra note 34, at 555-56, and Russell Korobkin, 
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1203, 1216-18 (2003) (contracts), with AAKER ET AL., supra note 222, at 627, 665, and Ste-
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14 (2003) (marketing). 
 224. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 481 (1996). 
 225. See, e.g., Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory 
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996); Steven Shavell, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991). 
 226. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 293 (1975); Korobkin, supra note 223; Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsub-
stantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977). 
 227. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573 
(2003); Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 309 (1993). 
 228. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related 
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Alan O. 
Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 43 (1990); George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique 
of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450 (1992). 
2005]      EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING HADLEY V. BAXENDALE 953 
 
tracts?229 And scholars draw heavily on economic analysis to study 
contract remedy issues ranging from expectation damages230 and spe-
cific performance231 to limitations on damage recovery such as miti-
gation,232 subjective loss,233 and the Hadley rule.234 All of these eco-
nomic theories might gain from empirical testing. 
 And across campus, marketing researchers follow a long tradition 
of empirical research.235 Over the last several decades, they have pio-
neered numerous data-driven studies that guide managerial deci-
sionmaking in diverse situations.236 Marketing scholars build dedi-
cated research centers to capture and analyze data.237 These centers 
                                                                                                                    
 229. See Posner, supra note 11, at 839-42. 
 230. See SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 343-53; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of 
Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Steven Shavell, Damage 
Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980) (refining the circumstances 
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 232. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 37. 
 233. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: 
The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1983). 
 234. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 235. See, e.g., CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 222; KOTLER, supra note 222; David 
H. Ahl, New Product Forecasting Using Consumer Panels, 7 J. MARKETING RES. 160 (1970); 
Gerald Albaum & Robert A. Peterson, Empirical Research in International Marketing: 
1976-1982, 15 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 161 (1984); N.D. Cadbury, When, Where, and How to Test 
Market, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1975, at 96. 
 236. To illustrate the range of topics addressed by the marketing sciences, consider 
Eyal Biyalogorsky et al., Research Note: Overselling with Opportunistic Cancellations, 18 
MARKETING SCI. 605 (1999) (offering techniques to improve profitability through pricing); 
Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, A Model of Web Site Browsing Behavior Esti-
mated on Clickstream Data, 40 J. MARKETING RES. 249 (2003) (examining browsing behav-
ior of 5000 random visitors to the website of an Internet automotive reseller); Ganesh Iyer, 
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition, 17 MARKETING SCI. 338 
(1998) (exploring how sellers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers com-
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Modeling Approach to Movie Screens Management, 18 MARKETING SCI. 352 (1999) (offering 
a decision support system in the media industry). The work speaks to many different audi-
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See Shugan, supra note 223, at 8-13 (suggesting fifteen different audiences likely to benefit 
from marketing research). Of particular interest is Professor Shugan’s suggestion that 
“litigation [is a] fertile area for provocative and important [marketing] research problems.” 
Id. at 13. He goes on to discuss, for example, how marketing research can contribute to 
damages assessment in private litigation disputes. Id. 
 237. A few notable marketing research centers include the following: The Alfred West 
Jr. Learning Lab at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, at 
http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/learning/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2005); Center for Retail 
Management at Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/retail/index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005); 
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research applied business problems with vast data sets and sophisti-
cated analytical techniques.238 This proliferation of empirical re-
search is aided, no doubt, by technological advancements that allow 
easier data capture at the point of purchase and comprehensive 
analysis at the back end.239 The work yields vast repositories of em-
pirical data. 
 In some cases, marketing researchers may be asking the same 
questions as contract law scholars. The use of willingness-to-pay re-
search to test Hadley models is one example.240 A similar approach 
might benefit other areas of contract law. For instance, there may be 
immediate connections with other problems related to measuring ex-
pectation damages, such as reduced recovery for subjective loss241 or 
the lost-volume seller problem.242 Economic work in these areas also 
depends on buyer valuation estimates or seller cost estimates that 
might be tested with marketing data. Similarly, marketing research 
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 240. See supra Part III. 
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note 233. 
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same price should receive any compensation for lost sales volume. Lawmakers may want to 
choose a default rule that exposes a seller’s cost structure so buyers will take efficient pre-
cautions against breach. For instance, a penalty default rule awarding no lost-profit dam-
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variable. See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1432 (1985); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers’ Damages: 
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may inform issues of contract interpretation243 or contract forma-
tion.244 It is worth exploring explicit connections more carefully. 
 While the call for empirical contract law research is loud, the 
work thus far is sparse.245 This may be explained by the significant 
investments of time, money, and training needed to conduct empiri-
cal projects.246 Thus, importing data from another research discipline 
might bring immediate benefits. The field of marketing may be a 
ready-made source of data for testing and refining economic models 
of contract law. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The last three decades of contract law scholarship have increas-
ingly relied on economic theory to support normative claims. But as 
the models grow more complicated, commentators are beginning to 
question whether economic analysis of contract law has failed. A new 
wave of empirical research is needed to test and refine theoretical 
claims, but it is unclear whether meaningful empirical projects are 
even possible. 
 The famous rule of Hadley v. Baxendale illustrates this tension, 
perhaps better than any other area of contract law. Hadley takes on 
great significance in the literature as an archetype for contract de-
fault rules that improve an economic system by exposing asymmetric 
information. But Hadley does not always work, and unfortunately it 
is difficult to determine when it will. Key variables in the Hadley 
models, such as the distribution of buyer valuations, are hard to 
measure. And the impact of multiple effects needs to be summed. Ul-
timately, there are hard questions about the appropriate level of 
granularity for the default rule: should it be applied to a single 
buyer, a single product, a single market, or the entire legal system? 
 Drawing upon recent work in the field of marketing, this Article 
has conducted an empirical assessment of the Hadley rule in three 
simple markets. It finds that Hadley typically generates more social 
                                                                                                                    
 243. For example, interpretation issues can raise similar doctrinal choices between ma-
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welfare than a full-damages default rule, suggesting that markets 
facing similar conditions might also benefit from the Hadley rule. 
 But these conclusions must be qualified. They do not hold when 
high-value buyers are much more likely to incur consequential dam-
ages or face very high transaction costs. A full-damages default rule 
is often better when low-value buyers take most of the benefits from 
tailored precautions. And introducing seller market power might also 
change the results. Thus, the work presents evidence in support of 
Hadley, but it also raises the need for more research in this area. 
 Finally, this Article suggests that existing work in the field of 
marketing may serve as a ready-made source of data for testing eco-
nomic theories of contract law. Marketing enjoys a rich tradition of 
empirical research, and the case for linking contract and marketing 
scholarship appeals on an intuitive level. Both disciplines deal fun-
damentally with transactional exchange. The use of willingness-to-
pay data to assess the Hadley rule is one example of the connection. 
It is possible that broader use of marketing research can address 
other perceived dead ends in contract law theory. 
 
 
